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Abstract 
This paper explores how throughout American history, a divide in opinion has formed between 
the class of political elites who occupy positions of power within our government, and the 
average American. Historical analyses have shown that the Supreme Court has been repeatedly 
politicized to benefit politicians and activists alike, though evidence shows that there is very 
little support for these types of behaviors in the public at large. Furthermore, a survey was 
conducted to ascertain whether the observed divide still exists within modern America, which 
provides insight into the current political stand-off that has taken place over who will the seat 
on the Supreme Court vacated by Antonin Scalia. Ultimately, the results reaffirm the existence 
of a two track incentive structure as it relates to the Supreme Court and nomination politics.  
 
This method allows us to examine historical developments and buttress them with modern data 
analyses to improve upon vague arguments solely concerned with nonpartisanship as it relates 
to the Judiciary in the modern era. It becomes clear that, in spite of realignment and 
institutional change, patterns of court politicization do not abate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the twenty first century, we have seen renewed evidence that the judicial branch has 
moved away from its apolitical ideal, morphing into a quasi-partisan football, with both parties 
maneuvering to ensure an ideological majority on the bench. While this process has been 
ongoing, the politicization of the branch has become far more extreme in the last quarter 
century. For example, in early in 2016, following the death of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, 
Senate Republicans announced that they would hold no hearings on any potential nominee that 
President Barack Obama might put forth to fill the newly vacated seat on the court, with 
majority leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) indicating that the decision was taken to ensure the 
people’s voices were considered in the nomination and appointment of Scalia’s successor. The 
move was unprecedented, and sent ripples through the American political system. In a New 
York Times article written shortly after this announcement, David Herszenhorn characterized 
the move as a “startling turn;” the first instance of such a blatantly partisan maneuver to block a 
candidate from reaching the Supreme Court (Herszenhorn 2016, 2). Indeed every nominee 
since 1955 has had public hearings in front of the Senate Judiciary committee, excluding two 
whose names were withdrawn before a public hearing was held, making Obama’s nominee, 
Judge Merrick Garland, the first nominee in over sixty years to not testify at a hearing before 
the committee (Fiske & Gorman 2016, 1).  
 However, this type of behavior is not an anomaly in the current State of American 
politics. Following Donald Trump’s stunning victory in the 2016 Presidential election, the 
script was flipped, placing Senate Democrats at odds with a potential nominee to the Supreme 
Court. Prior to any formal announcement of a nominee by the Trump White House, Politico 
reported that Senate Democrats would filibuster whoever was put forth to fill the court’s 
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yearlong vacancy, which would be only the second time in modern history that the Senate had 
mounted a filibuster against a nominee (Everett et al. 2016). Politicians frequently cite the will 
of the people as the basis for these actions, but is that truly the case? 
 Throughout the history of the Supreme Court, there has been a fundamental disconnect 
between the political class of individuals that occupy the legislative and judicial branches of 
government and the average American citizen who possesses far less insight into the 
Constitution. The justices who have decided cases for the nation have often been venerated and 
held above politics; they were heralded as impartial arbiters of the law, though ironically the 
positions they held were inherently political. Justices are nominated by politicians, confirmed 
by politicians, swear in politicians, and decide the issues of the highest political salience, 
putting them at the forefront of ideological debate in this country. The Constitution imbues the 
Supreme Court with the power to effect change in the United States, which has led to the body 
being targeted by the political elite, who have often harnessed this ability for change - to 
institute and enact political agendas. So, is the recent surge in polarization that we have seen 
surrounding this hallowed institution a consequence of a change in the American electorate or 
rather the result of decisions made by politically active citizens who have sought to exploit the 
court to further their own aims? 
 Traditional answers have often focused on the individual as the driving force being 
Supreme Court outcomes. Many argue that the strength of the President directly correlates to 
whether a nominee to the Supreme Court is successfully confirmed, while others point directly 
to partisanship, stating that party alone is a strong enough predictor of how Senators will vote. 
Per this view, opposition or support of a nominee flows directly from what party they identify 
with, with same party Senators voting for confirmation, with opposite party Senators voting 
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against. Similar to this argument is the idea that the ideological distance from the President 
determines the ways in which Senators will ultimately decide to vote, though the substantive 
differences between this and the prior argument are very minute, if they exist at all. 
Alternatively, some scholars say the final decision is influenced by the individual 
characteristics of the nominee, namely whether they are qualified for the position, the number 
of years of experience they have in the judicial branch, and their individual ideology. And 
furthermore, others argue that it is the effect of interest groups that create Supreme Court 
outcomes, though these arguments are largely based on partisan, ideological foundations and in 
this way are not that different from earlier explanations.  
 These explanations are piece-meal in nature, and do not distinguish the forest from the 
trees. It is foolhardy to focus solely on the individual characteristics of certain persons involved 
in the nomination process, while neglecting the influence of other actors who might potentially 
sway outcomes in unforeseen ways. This paper on the other hand, argues that all of these 
previously named actors have an influence on the Supreme Court nomination politics, though 
they must be examined as a substantive group to truly recognize the aggregate effect that is 
exhibited by the sum influence of all relevant individuals connected to the process. This group, 
the American political elite, is the driving force behind recent trends of the politicization of the 
Supreme Court nomination process, however outcomes are not ideologically driven as scholars 
have long argued. Rather, they represent a concerted effort to influence the political agenda 
through the jurisprudence of those already on the court, and by creating a highly selective and 
partisan process of choosing who eventually takes a seat on the Court. Through political 
calculations, members of the political elite use the Supreme Court and the nomination process 
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to bring about desired changes to the American legal and political system, circumventing the 
legislative process entirely.  
 However, what is important to distinguish is that this type of brinksmanship is not the 
desired outcome of the American public. So often we hear Presidents, Senators, activists, and 
lobbyists invoking the name of the American people to justify the actions that are being taken, 
though in the case of the Supreme Court, though this is a false narrative. Elites exhibit control 
over the judicial agenda, while neglecting the interests of average Americans who strongly 
prefer a nonpartisan, nonideological, functioning Supreme Court. In this way it becomes 
abundantly clear that there is not a broad consensus behind the obstructionist and explicitly 
political actions taken by both parties in the Senate, but rather there are two distinct ways of 
viewing the issue; the political elites see an opportunity to score political points and further 
their agendas, while the mass public would prefer the process to be less ideological and more 
focused on the qualifications and characteristics of each nominee.  
 Evidence suggest that this divide is nothing new, and in fact, has existed since the very 
beginning of the American experiment. If one conducts an analysis of American history, there 
are a plethora of highly salient instances of court politicization, with each one serving as a 
stepping-stone. While the framers of the constitution had a specific aim in mind when they 
created the Judiciary, in practice it has always been the target of politicians who attempted to 
erode its legitimacy, control its agenda, or attempt to render decisions a fait accompli by 
manipulating the nomination process. However, it was not just politicians who used the court in 
this way, with several key Justices using their powers as jurists to expand and augment the 
power of the Supreme Court to truly transform it into a policy making body. In each of these 
instances, there was very little public support for the actions undertaken, demonstrating the 
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existence of an intellectual divide between those who gained from using the court as a partisan 
body and those who found it anathema to Democracy. These two groups were the American 
political elite, and the American public.  
 Additionally, this divide has persisted throughout all the critical realigning periods in 
American history. In this way, court politicization serves as a source of continuity within 
processes of both electoral and institutional change. Thus, these behaviors are a rare constant in 
a history filled with a multitude of examples of political upheaval and partisan turnover.  
 A survey conducted in early 2017 pertaining to the Supreme Court and its nomination 
process both quantifies and validates this finding, solidifying the notion that there is a divide 
between what actions we see political elites undertake, and what their constituents truly desire. 
Regardless of political affiliation, on both partisan and nonpartisan questions, a broad 
consensus appeared amongst the five hundred individuals who were surveyed. As previously 
expressed, this consensus ran counter to the agendas being currently pursued by politicians in 
the Senate who desire to use nominees to the Supreme Court to indirectly exert agenda 
controlling authority over the court’s docket and decisions. Importantly, the historical and 
contemporary examples are not describing two different tales of court politicization, but rather 
they fit together like puzzle pieces. The current political standoff is a result of historical 
developments, and without them, might not have even existed.  
 These findings have far reaching consequences for the field of political science, as they 
contradict some of the most commonplace assertions about modern America, specifically data 
showing increasing trends of partisanship throughout the country. While members of the 
political classes (politicians, activists, etc.) may be moving farther apart on some of the central 
issues facing the country, this is not in of itself a reflection of trends within the American 
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electorate. Rather, there exists a certain subset of issues in which a majority of Americans are 
very close together, in spite of their political beliefs, their race, their age, or where they come 
from.   
 Following the Presidential election of 2016, many saw the nations as deeply divided and 
wrought by bitter political disagreements. This research shows that there may be more 
agreement amongst partisans then pundits or politicians previously believed, which is perhaps 
missed due to the teamsmanship of political parties and the horse race coverage of elections 
that focuses on winners and losers. Evidence showing that Democrats, Republicans, and 
Independents has tremendous value given the current state of American politics, as it 
demonstrates there is more room to forge a common consensus than previously believed. It also 
offers hope that the current impasse over nominees to the Supreme Court may soon abate, 
allowing the Judiciary to perhaps move towards its apolitical ideal.  
 This paper explores the determinants of the historical variations in the role of the court 
in the American political system and examines the ways in which the current political climate 
is both emblematic of and a result of developments that have taken place in the United States 
throughout its 241-year existence. While a change in public opinion may have had a minute 
effect on the growth and evolution of the Supreme Court, the driving force behind the major 
alterations in judicial philosophy and changes in the nomination process have been championed 
and undertaken by individuals whose interest and involvement in the political realm was far 
outside the norm of the average American.  
 There are two key aspects of the courts history that are discussed within the paper, the 
first of which is that incremental developments in the courts power have taken place throughout 
the history of the United States, with each new change building upon the previous expansions 
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of the courts power. This is done by tracing the evolution of the court through preexisting 
literature, and connecting each moment back to the overarching theme of the paper, which is 
that political interests have been central to the shaping of the highest legal institution in the 
land. In doing so, it becomes evident that instances of court politicization are woven throughout 
American history, and that the elite vs mass conflict we witness today is by no means a new 
occurrence.   
 The second part of the paper focuses on the current standoff over Supreme Court 
nominees and is augmented by contemporary survey research. This case study will help to 
connect the historical aspects of the paper with the present political predicament. Ideally each 
of the modifications in the structure of the Supreme Court and the nomination process will 
mirror the current political situation, with the aims of political elite trumping the will of the 
people, resulting in a system that reflects the desires of those with the highest political acumen. 
This will demonstrate that this is not a purely historical development, but rather one that still 
hold deep relevance today.  
 In order to clarify what this paper is, it is also profoundly important to establish what 
this paper is not. This paper does not seek to make distinctions between the actions of either 
American political party, nor does is make any assertions regarding the policy positions of 
partisans within the United States. The argument of this paper is nonideological in nature; the 
political elite encompasses elected officials, activists, judges, and other individuals who have 
extensive knowledge of the American political and legal system and participate in the 
established political apparatus on a highly frequent basis. This group encompasses individuals 
from a range of political parties, whether they are Republicans, Democrats, Whigs, or even 
Federalists, demonstrating that this is not a tactic that is utilized by a single party when it is in 
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power, but rather by a range of individuals with different political positions, across almost two 
and a half centuries of American history. The most important implication of this is that changes 
in politics in the United States have not led to tectonic shifts in the way the political elite 
interact with the Supreme court; at every watershed moment in the courts history, it is evident 
that this same dynamic plays out over and over again. The agenda of a handful of influential 
politicians and activists triumphed either irrespective of or in spite of the dominant position of 
American citizens at the time, further driving the politization of the United States Supreme 
Court.  
 Furthermore, this paper does not purport the existence of a disconnect between upper 
and lower class Americans and it does not draw conclusions based upon some notion of the 
divide between Americans based on socioeconomic status. Scholars have long argued that the 
United States is a “classless” society, and indeed, the notion of class struggle is foreign to most 
Americans. Frederick Storbel and Wallace Peterson argue as much, writing that America never 
experienced the “static, hierarchical structure of class that Europe knew under feudalism.” 
Rather the two assert that American society was “generally more open and experienced greater 
mobility than was true of European society,” resulting in a nation which has very limited 
experience with class conflict (Storbel & Peterson 1997, 3). While political differences do exist 
across income levels, for the purposes of this paper, the group constituting the political elite is 
not analogous with those individuals comprise the “upper class” due to their levels of wealth or 
income. Thus, the elite v mass public conflict being explored by this paper is not a story of 
class warfare, but instead a narrative of individuals using the court for an instrument of often 
unpopular social and political changes.  
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Literature Review: 
 There are three main schools of thought when it comes to Supreme Court nomination 
politics – that the process is either a) a function of the characteristics of the nominees b) a 
function of American public opinion or c) a function of ideology and/or institutional structures 
of American political insiders. Each explanation offers compelling evidence, and presents 
theories that are largely valid, though each fails to capture the entire picture. In actuality, it is 
not one or the other, but more accurately a blend of the three that includes other factors such as 
institutional arrangements or actions beyond individual control.  
Judge Characteristic Centric: 
 The arguments that focus on the characteristics of judges examine the ways in which 
different aspects of Supreme Court nominees determine whether these individuals are 
confirmed or denied. Examples of such characteristics are the judge’s qualifications, their 
ideology, and the ideology of the outgoing Justice whose seat they might potentially fill. 
Furthermore, past decisions are often examined to determine if the nominee has a history of 
“legislating from the bench.”  
 A large body of work exists that examines the dynamics that surround nominations of 
political appointees, specifically analyzing Senator’s motivations for voting individuals up or 
down. However, unlike cabinet nominees, previous research has shown that around eighteen 
percent of Supreme Court nominees have been rejected, far more than the miniscule number of 
other political appointees to be rejected (Cottrill and Peretti 2013, 15). These authors go on to 
make a key determination, noting that “judicial decisions can help or hinder politicians in their 
electoral and policy aims,” which suggests that the process of selecting the next justice for the 
Supreme Court in inherently a political matter, rather than the nonpartisan exercise the framers 
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may have intended it to be. In this way, the authors argue that the ultimate determinant of a 
judge’s confirmation or rejection is a function of that particular judge’s ideology, as opposed to 
the ideologies of Senators.  
 In terms of qualifications, when one considers the nominees to the Court who failed to 
attain confirmation by the Senate, it might be assumed that those twenty individuals were 
obviously unfit or else somehow unqualified for service on the Supreme bench. Yet, on the 
contrary, scholars have found that “not one of the twenty was probably any less well qualified 
for service than some of those who have won confirmation,” with many of the failed nominees 
being eminently well qualified for the position to which they were nominated (Goff 1961, 357). 
Per this argument, the qualifications of nominees are largely considered to be irrelevant in the 
final vote calculus of confirmation. Therefore, if qualified nominees are frequently rejected, 
what then can explain nomination politics? 
 Scholars such as P. S. Ruckman, Jr. have argued that this phenomenon may be the result 
of a subset of nominations that are far more salient and important to the court’s future than the 
average nomination, and these are aptly referred to as critical nominations. In his piece, 
Ruckman maintains that while all nominations to the Supreme Court are important, some 
involve much higher stakes, resulting in far more bitter confirmation fights. In these instances, 
he argues, the outcome of the Senate’s decision can have a direct impact on the interest of 
certain groups with great political relevance. That is, in a few specific situations, considerations 
of a nominee’s character and qualifications, as well as the political circumstances surrounding a 
nomination, can be “overshadowed or at least equaled by considerations focusing on the seat 
which is to be filled” (Ruckman 1993, 795). In this way, an individual nominee’s qualifications 
might not be considered as important as the direction of the institution, which may explain why 
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qualified nominees are so often rejected by the Senate.  
 Ruckman finds that these critical nominations come about when there is a chance that 
one party may gain an upper hand in the Supreme Court, meaning they will change the 
ideological balance of the court. Specifically, the data shows that 60% of all unsuccessful 
nominations have involved attempted opposite party replacement, meaning the party in control 
sought to replace a departing judge who was confirmed by the opposing party. This is a stark 
difference to occasions where there is “continuous party representation,” meaning the party 
putting forth a judge also put forth the name of the outgoing justice, wherein only 13% of 
nominations have been unsuccessful (Ruckman 1993, 797).  In this case, the characteristic in 
question again relates to the ideology of the nominee, however contrastingly, in this instance 
the nominee’s ideology is only relevant when compared to that of the departing justice’s; if the 
gap is too significant, this can often lead to a rejection. This seems to prove that the ideological 
balance of the court is one of the most important aspects of the nomination process, suggesting 
that politicians and partisans actively oppose nominees who represent a change to the political 
status quo.  
 More relevantly, Ruckman also writes that “nominations which potentially establish a 
new partisan majority on the Court certainly qualify for a category of nominations in which 
attempted opposite party replacement would have noticeable impact,” (Ruckman 1993, 798) 
which was the case with the more moderate Merrick Garland potentially replacing the far more 
conservative Antonin Scalia. However, if Ruckman’s argument holds true for this 
contemporary example, it would suggest that, contrary to Senate Republican’s repeated 
assertions, ignoring Garland’s nomination was in fact not what the American people wanted, 
but rather a calculated maneuver to maintain a political advantage – a strategic move to protect 
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the interests of the political elite.  
 Consistent with these theories, scholars have also found an increasing trend for what 
many refer to as “legislating from the bench,” or judges using their positions to enact their 
policy preferences in law. If the President’s nominee is confirmed, one of the most important 
characteristics they must possess is veneration for the law, or a commitment to abstain from 
judicial overreach. However, Trevor Thomas argues that this is in fact becoming the new norm 
for American Jurists, with partisan preferences and ideological considerations now taking 
precedent over the former norm of partisan balance (Thomas 2011, 25). To Thomas’ point, 
recently judges have been wading into political matters more frequently, which many consider 
to be a contradiction given the supposed nonpartisan nature of their positions. This behavior is 
often seen as incredibly harmful to democracy, and it is often very hard for a nominee to be 
confirmed if they lack an adequate respect for the constitution.  
 However, in a larger sense, the literature also suggests that partisanship extends beyond 
the nomination process, which is inherently political, to federal courtrooms across the country, 
giving credence to the notion that judges are becoming instruments of political change. Using 
the position of an unelected judge in this way perverts the democratic systems that are in place 
in the United States, and is a prime example of the political classes hijacking the judicial 
branch to carry out political agendas. 
Public Opinion Driven: 
 Arguments that center on the specific characteristics of individual nominees often fall 
short as they cannot adequately explain the reason for certain anomalous cases where extremely 
qualified Judges have either been unexpectedly denied or confirmed. In these instances, the 
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argument is often that the observed outcome is a function of public opinion – that is the way the 
public uses its voice to exert pressure on their elected representatives. Consequently, Jonathan 
P. Kastellec, Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips have attempted to explore the effect of public 
opinion on nomination politics, endeavoring to find a connection between the public’s 
preferences and the way a Senator ultimately votes on a nominee to the court. The authors note 
that the effect of public opinion on nomination politics is often overlooked, indicating that the 
factors mentioned above are the primary focus of most theories that have been put forth by 
political scientists. However, their research does produce compelling evidence that public 
opinion may have a significant effect on the way senator’s vote.  
 The results of the study by Kastellec et al., lend themselves to a more comprehensive 
model of nomination politics that includes public opinion as a significant and possibly highly 
influential factor. They find that public opinion, on average, “matters more than any predictor 
other than the senator’s own ideological differences with the nominee” (Kastellec et al. 2010, 
768). These findings indicate that public opinion should play a major role in determining 
whether a judge is ultimately approved to sit on the Supreme Court, but does include the 
corollary that a Senator’s own ideological differences with the nominee are often more 
important, serving as cause for a ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ vote in front of the full senate, regardless of the 
public’s stance.  
 Their conclusions suggests that the process is not completely driven by the political 
elites, and find robust support for the notion that public opinion plays a role on the way 
senators interact with nominees, though notable exceptions to their findings exist. For example, 
Kastellec et al. note that partisanship and the political environment matter greatly to the 
outcomes of Supreme Court nominations, writing that “senators tend to approve nominees of a 
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president of the same party and of a president who is ‘strong’ in that his party controls the 
Senate and he is not in his fourth year of office” (Kastellec et al. 2010, 768). Thus, the authors 
acknowledge that, in addition to a Senator’s ideological distance from a nominee, political 
realities and partisan calculations can override the effect of public opinion when it comes time 
to vote. Given that the United States Congress has become far more polarized in the last half 
century, it is not a stretch to imagine that in the modern Senate, examples of senators ignoring 
the wishes of their constituents in favor of supporting the party line have become 
commonplace.  
 Additionally, outside groups like lobbyists can have a significant impact on the 
nomination process. Highly salient campaigns against nominees have taken place, with the 
most notable examples being the cases of judge Robert Bork, who’s nomination was defeated, 
and that of now Justice Clarence Thomas, who barely survived the testimony of Anita Hill to 
take his seat on the bench. Instances like these have led to a reevaluation of the ways in which 
lobbying efforts alter senator’s stances on the judges who are put forth to occupy the highest 
court in the land. Gregory Caldeira and John Wright studied these phenomena, examining the 
coalitions of activists that used their influence to both support and oppose these nominees. 
Overall, they find that interest group lobbying had a statistically significant effect on senator’s 
votes on both Bork and Thomas, with lobbying activity for the nominee is predicted by the 
“organizational strength of supportive groups at the state level.” Put simply, this means that 
groups target senators from states where they have a significant presence in terms of members 
and activists (Caldeira & Wright 1998, 513). In this way, groups can ensure their efforts have 
the maximum effect, though again the authors write the effect interest groups have is also 
mitigated by the ideology and the partisanship of the senators.   
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 More importantly however, Caldeira and Wright indicate that lobbying groups serve as 
a proxy for public opinion. Their results demonstrate that interest group lobbying provided 
important information to senators “above and beyond what they might have gleaned from 
public opinion polls and constituency demographics,” meaning grassroots lobbying campaigns 
are essential to communicate constituents preferences to their senators (Caldeira & Wright 
1998, 521). However, in this instance, lobbyists are using public opinion as a political tool; this 
same type of lobbying does not occur for all nominations, it only occurred during two of the 
most salient, controversial nominations in the history of the Supreme Court. Ultimately, this 
demonstrates that political elites are still using nominations to further their political aims, 
though in this case they prime and mobilize public opinion to work in their favor.  
Insider Driven: 
 As was just noted by Caldeira and Wright political insiders like lobbyists can have a 
direct impact on Supreme Court nominations by appealing directly to elected officials and 
mobilizing public opinion in favor of their chosen cause. While public opinion can undoubtedly 
have an effect, in most cases it appears to be overruled by partisan and ideological stimuli, 
indicating that perhaps the strongest determinant who is and is not confirmed comes down to 
the personal politics and beliefs of the insiders involved in the process of nominating and 
voting on potential justices. This group includes activists and lobbyists alike, however 
politicians far and away are the most important members of this group as their decision-making 
processes quite literally formulate the ultimate result.   
 A model exists explaining the calculus of Senate votes on nominees to the Supreme 
Court, focusing on three main areas of importance - the qualifications of the nominee, strength 
of the President at the time, and the parties of each Senator as well as the President. This 
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paradigm argues that, firstly, the qualifications of a nominee are incredibly important, for a 
wholly unqualified nominee would be rejected out of hand, finding that the likelihood of a yes 
vote increases as individual nominees are more qualified (Shipan 2008). Yet as previously 
noted, qualifications are poor predictors of confirmation, as nominees of the highest quality are 
often rejected. 
 On the question of Presidential strength, previous work suggests that the President’s 
strength is also key to the successful nomination of judge to the court, as those President’s who 
are perceived to be “lame ducks” or inept at managing congress are very unlikely to garner 
significant support for their nominees. Ostensibly, as a President’s strength grows, so too does 
the probability of a Senator voting for that President’s nominee, and this holds true across both 
parties.  
 Lastly, and most importantly, the parties of each Senator and the party of the President 
are of paramount importance to nominee’s odds of being confirmed. The paper found that “not 
only that a senator is more likely to vote for a nominee if the president and senator are from the 
same party, but also that this effect is heightened in recent years” (Shipan 2008, 67). The 
converse also holds true, indeed Senators who are not of the President’s party are far more 
likely to oppose a Presidents nominee, regardless of the qualifications of that candidate. On the 
whole, Shipan concludes that Senators are far more likely to vote against a nominee than they 
were in the past, indicating that increased partisanship and an increase reliance on the ideology 
of nominees at least partially explain this change, though Shipan is silent on whether Senators 
are swain by or even consider public opinion before voting on candidates for the Supreme 
Court. 
 Separately, there is a significant amount of work in game theory that focuses on the 
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ideological space in which a President can select a nominee for the Supreme Court. David 
Rohde and Kenneth Shepsle write that President’s have formerly had a fairly free hand in 
selecting extreme nominees for federal courts, due to the fact that one appointment has very 
little potential to result in legitimate policy change. However, this is not true of the Supreme 
Court, where one appointment can potentially shape policy for a number of decades following 
the Senate votes the individual onto the court. Focusing on the points needed to end a filibuster, 
Rohde and Shepsle construct an interval, between the forty-first and sixtieth senators, which 
they refer to as the gridlock interval. They write that, as the Senate has become more polarized, 
and in effect as the Supreme Court has become more politicized, the locations of the gridlock 
interval endpoints have become more extreme, and the gridlock interval has thus grown (Rohde 
& Shepsle, 2007). This increase in polarization, and as a result, the increase in the distance 
between the gridlock intervals may explain why the process of nominating and confirming a 
new supreme court justice has become so difficult, yet it is important to emphasize that this 
explanation also focuses on ideology as the chief impediment to confirmations, rather than a 
change in the American electorate.   
 Consequently, in his piece for the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Matthew Hitt 
similarly focuses on the power the chief executive of the United States can exhibit on the 
process of nominating a justice to the Supreme Court. Of course, the President plays a central 
role in selecting the nominee to be considered by the Senate, but Hitt argues this does not 
capture the full breadth of influence the President has on who ultimately fills a seat on 
America’s highest court. The President has the ability to select a wide variety of nominees, 
ranging in experience relevant for the job, and this ability is a function of what Hitt refers to as 
the “constraints” on the President. These constraints are limits to the ideology and experience 
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of any potential nominees, as an individual who lies too far outside the norm, or more 
technically, the median point of the Senate. Ultimately, the President may strategically choose 
less experienced nominees, in the event that a highly experienced nominee is less likely to be 
successfully confirmed (Hitt, 2013).   
 Hitt’s findings consistent with those of Shipan, with Hitt adding that while selecting 
nominees that are highly qualified maintains its importance, selecting nominees who have had 
more relevant experience with the judicial branch, the President will experience greater success 
with his or her appointments. Further, the president’s ability to appoint these experienced 
nominees is, as stated earlier, a function of the constraining regime of the Senate. In explaining 
why relevant experience has become so relevant, Hitt points to a moment a watershed moment 
in history - the appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren by Dwight Eisenhower. Warren had 
been the former Attorney General of California as well as the Governor, but lacked any 
experience as a judge. The Warren Court would become one of the most liberal in history, 
prompting future President’s to consider a potential nominees past before taking action. This 
again reveals that politicians want justices who are predictable, whose decisions are nearly 
preordained, indicating the supremacy of ideological calculation in the nomination and 
confirmations of Supreme Court Justices. 
 Although this may be true, the duration of nomination battles are also highly 
enlightening when considering the ideological entrenchment that surrounds all aspects of the 
United States Supreme Court. Charles Shipan, Brooke Thomas Allen & Andrew Bargen focus 
on institutional arrangements and the incentives of a President when choosing a nominee for 
the Supreme Court, finding that “a focus on duration can illuminate the conflicts that underlie 
appointments,” regardless of the outcome (Shipan et al. 2014, 4). They find that it is in a 
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President’s interest to act quickly to appoint a judge to fill a vacant seat on the Supreme Court, 
not because it would make sure the court functioned the way it was intended to or was able to 
efficiently process the incredibly important cases on its docket, but rather because “the sooner 
the president can act, the sooner his preferences may be represented on the Court” (Shipan et al. 
2014, 5). 
 The authors also find that when the President must work with a Senate controlled by the 
opposing party, he or she will take a longer time to settle on a nominee, in part to ensure they 
have a firm understanding on the nominee’s ideology, but also to consider the way the Senate 
will react to his or her choice and gauge the probability of a successful nomination. Shipan et 
al. argue this is so important to a President, because they would like to move the court more in 
line with their ideological preferences, rather than those of the Senate, finding strong support 
for the claim that partisan and policy preferences do in fact matter during the nomination stage 
(Shipan et al. 2014). While the nomination process is inherently political, these findings 
reinforce the idea that the Supreme Court is and has always been treated in a way consistent 
with other more political governmental institutions. As previously stated, the President’s 
calculations revolve around the nominee’s ideology, and the likelihood that the nominee will be 
confirmed and deliver decisions in line with the President’s agenda. This again suggests the 
Court is a tool of the political elite, being used to enact policy change.  
  Finally, Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal and Chad Westerland affirm all of these 
points, explicitly focusing on the increasing importance of ideology and partisanship in the 
Supreme Court nomination progress. Epstein et al. write that it is inevitable that elected 
politicians will have opinions, and these personal beliefs will inherently affect whom they 
select to sit on the Supreme Court and whether that individual is eventually confirmed or 
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rejected. They assert that while ideology has always been central to the nominations process, 
both on the parts of Senators and nominees, its importance has been substantially increasing 
over time, using the case of Robert Bork as an example. The authors constructed coefficients to 
express how important ideology has been in evaluating potential Supreme Court Justices, and 
found that the coefficient jumped from -1.71 before Bork to a significantly more substantial -
6.33 for all nominees after and including Bork, though they maintain this pattern had been 
building for quite a long time, pointing to the nomination of Justice Harlan in 1955 as another 
notable example (Epstein et al. 2007, 631). These data suggest that ideology is without a doubt 
the most important determinant of Supreme Court outcomes, but moreover demonstrate that the 
increasing reliance on ideology is a trend that has been steadily increasing over time, regardless 
of which party is in power.  
Consequences: 
  It becomes clear then that the Supreme Court is a quasi-political institution, and some 
scholars have argued it was always intended to be. In a piece for the George Washington 
University Law Review, Maeva Marcus writes that the Supreme Court is a political institution 
“in every sense of the word,” and moreover that it was always intended to be (Marcus 2003, 
95). In her piece, she remarks that, from the very beginning of the republic, members of 
congress and President alike have brought justices into the political fray, indicating that the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 proves that Congress always intended justices to be political actors, 
rather than the nonpartisan arbiters of truth many believed the framers intended them to be 
(Marcus 2003). 
 Thus, the body of previous work that exists overwhelmingly suggests that the process of 
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nominating and confirming a Supreme Court Justice is incredibly political and politicized. 
Ideology and political calculations play the biggest role in all facets of the process – who to 
choose, when to nominate them, how they are voted on, and once they are on the court, much is 
made of how they will rule in the nations most controversial cases. However, little work has 
been done to examine what has been driving the politicization of the Court, and why overtly 
partisan maneuvers and rhetoric have become the norm in nomination politics, rather than the 
anomaly the nations founders intended them to be.   
 All of this obstructionism and partisanship begs the question, is this type of radical 
brinksmanship really what the American people would have wanted? Or is this simply another 
case of political elites controlling the judicial agenda? Through an in depth analysis of the most 
important moments in American judicial history, it becomes clear that the latter is the case.  
  Ultimately, the history of the Supreme Court has been marked by this type of ideational 
divide - the disconnect between the political have’s and the have not’s has always been evident 
throughout every watershed moment in the court’s history. This elite versus mass public 
conflict has shaped the development of the court, from its founding all the way to the modern 
day. To the political elite, the court serves as an instrument of change that is intrinsically linked 
to the political process, and legal challenges have increasingly become used to further partisan 
agendas. However, this view of the court is anathema to large portions of the American 
populace, who still desire a non-partisan court capable of separating questions of legality from 
questions of ideology.  
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SECTION I: THE HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONALIZED POLITICIZATION  
Part A: The Early American System 
 For many, this history of the Supreme Court starts with the establishment of judicial 
review by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1803. That famous case, Marbury v. Madison, serves 
as the bedrock of the courts functionality in the political arena in the United States, but at the 
time it too represented and unpopular action taken to benefit a political party that was quickly 
losing its grasp on power. Indeed the decision to even establish judicial review represents a 
political maneuver on the part of John Marshall. At its conception, the US Supreme Court was 
envisioned as an impartial body that would exist solely to interpret law rather than create it by 
statute as it often does today. Alexander Hamilton, co author of the famous Federalist Papers 
and advocate for an independent judiciary wrote in The Federalist 78 “the judiciary, on the 
contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength 
or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said 
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment (Hamilton, The Federalist 78).” 
Hamilton insisted that the sole purpose of the Judiciary would be to interpret the laws, making 
it far inferior the both the Executive branch, which controlled the military, and the legislative 
branch, which maintained control of commerce and appropriations; so long as it remained 
separate from the other two branches, it was inherently harmless to American liberty.  
 This was the commonly accepted view of the Supreme Court from 1789 roughly until 
the decision in the Marbury case in 1803, and under this view, the justices were merely the 
agents of the people. Popular sovereignty was the only acceptable theory for American 
government in 1789, so Marshall’s decision to alter this framework to create an institution 
capable of acting on its own would have been considered controversial at this period in time 
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(Presser 2002). Indeed future President James Madison was opposed to the idea of judicial 
review, as he believed that such a power would give the judiciary de facto superiority over the 
legislative branch, which Madison believed was unacceptable and contradictory to the 
intentions of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention (Harrington 2003, 87). However, in 
spite of this popularly held belief, the Chief Justice would take steps to create a court capable of 
overturning the decisions of both the Executive and Legislative branches if they conflicted with 
the constitution – in essence giving unelected judges the ability to overturn the will of the 
American people. Scholars have paid little attention to the political nature of the Court's 
decision-making in its first decade (Marcus 2003), however the decision in Marbury was, 
without a doubt, a politically motivated decision.  
 The fundamentally controversy associated with Marshall’s decision was that through 
the exercise of its power of judicial review, which has included the authority to examine the 
constitutionality of the decisions and laws of the federal executive, the federal legislature, and 
the state governments. Furthermore, scholars have indicated that they believe the framers to 
have contemplated judicial review as being within the powers of the third branch of 
government (Secola 1988), but at the time of Marbury v Madison, the court was very much a 
political entity and indeed found itself in the middle of a political conundrum. The federalists, a 
party to which Marshall belonged, had just lost the White House, and there was an issue 
regarding the delivering of commission to appointees of the previous President, John Adams. 
The Marbury case represents the first time the court was used by a class of political elites to 
further their agenda in spite of the common will.  
 Marshall, by ruling that Marbury was entitled to his commission, but refusing to deliver 
a writ of mandamus, ensured he was appeasing all parties involved, and avoided appearing to 
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overtly play favorites with members of his own party. However, this was not the controversial 
part of the decision – Marshall then declared the Judiciary act of 1789 to be unconstitutional, as 
it added to the courts original jurisdiction, leaving the law null and void. By doing so, Marshall 
in essence created judicial review, and delineated a power to the Court that had not been 
expressly given to it in the United States Constitution.  
 This aspect of the decision, the ability to declare actions of the elected branches of 
government, went against the fundamental beliefs of Americans at the time. Indeed, as 
Hamilton had written, the widely accepted purpose of the Supreme Court of the United States 
was to pass judgment on issues brought before it, not to decide which laws would be allowed to 
stand. The argument can be made that the founders of our nation had always intended for 
judicial review to eventually come into existence, and indeed many have (Secola 1988), 
however this is contradictory to what we know about the beliefs of the people in this early 
period of American history. Many individuals at the constitutional convention were wary of a 
central court for just this reason, they feared that unelected justices with lifetime appointments 
could wreak havoc on the system of governance they had worked so hard to create, and for this 
reason the court’s power was expressly limited, ensuring it was the weakest of the three 
branches of government. Therefore, in expanding the power of the court in this way, Marshall 
was going against the will of the American people, who had placed faith in the court with the 
hopes that it would serve as a purely judgmental body as Hamilton had reassured them it 
would.  
 This decision by Marshall was one that helped him further his own agenda, not for one 
political party or another, but rather to ensure the court’s longevity and legitimacy, in spite of 
the out cry that ensued after his invalidation of a congressional statute. In the Bridgeport Law 
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Review, Joseph Secola validated this assertion, writing that, “as Marshall saw it, the 
Constitution embodied enduring principles that could be adapted to various crises and problems 
in the nation's future” (Secola 1988, 29). It becomes clear that John Marshall was attempting to 
create an institution capable of protecting the Constitution for many years to come, and the only 
way to truly do this was to imbue the Supreme Court with the ability to strike down laws that 
they felt conflicted with the supreme law of the land, even if that decision was antithetical to 
how many Americans wanted the court to function.  
 Marshall often referred to the “people” as his source of authority enabling the Supreme 
Court to carry out its decisions, however several of his decisions would cause widespread 
outrage across the United State. If the decision in Marbury left people perturbed, the courts 
ruling in Marshall’s other most famous case, McCulloch v Maryland would leave Americans 
fuming at the court’s overreach. In this period, State’s rights were incredibly important, as their 
experience as a unified nation was limited. In McCulloch, the fundamental conflict was 
between the authority of the Federal government, who had established a central bank, and the 
authority of the state of Maryland, who had attempted to levy taxes upon that bank. This 
situation was monumental in that it was one of the first ever instances of a State’s decision 
coming under federal review. The magnitude of the case was palpable; sensing this, the court 
extended the duration of oral arguments to one week while allowing both the prosecution and 
defense an additional lawyer (Ray 2016). 
 Writing for a unanimous court, Marshall found that that Congress had the power to 
incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government 
employed in the execution of constitutional powers. Furthermore, Marshall expressed that 
Congress possessed unenumerated powers not explicitly outlined in the Constitution, and that 
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any federal laws made under the jurisdiction of the Constitution were supreme, and superseded 
any state law or ordinance. However, allowing the Second Bank of the United States to exist 
was not the main complaint of individuals in the aftermath of McCulloch; many Americans felt 
that this decision was an attack on states rights, which were considered essential to maintaining 
the freedom and liberty that had been hard won from the British during the Revolution. Indeed, 
many concluded that the doctrine of Congress’s implied powers that had been established by 
Marshall in this decision would strip away much of the State’s sovereignty, and render them 
wholly subordinate to the political will of the national government (Ray 2016). 
 It again becomes evident that in this instance, the court was being used as a device to 
further a goal of a member of the political elite, at the expense of the common American. While 
one might argue his decision was in the institutional interest of the Court, John Marshall was a 
federalist; a member of a party that believed the national government should be highly 
centralized and superior to that of each individual state. Though this decision was not taken by 
a politician, Marshall had served as the Secretary of State under the previous administration, 
meaning his past was explicitly political. His decision in McCulloch again represents a 
furthering of a political agenda, in spite of the commonly held views of average Americans. 
Under Marshall, both the Supreme Court and the national government of the United States 
would garner broad decision making authority, and would see their power significantly 
expanded, which would have been anathema to the values that many of the framers, and a 
majority of American’s held at the time. Furthermore, by ruling against the state of Maryland, 
he implicitly stripped states of some of their power, granted to the by the tenth amendment of 
the Constitution. States rights were seen as a bulwark against tyranny from the federal 
government, and reducing these protection show that this decision was taken in spite of the 
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commonly held beliefs of the American people.  
 We can infer the position of most Americans on this issue, by considering the direction 
of the Federal government at the time. While this is a flawed system, considering the 
disenfranchisement of broad swaths of the American electorate at the time, the previous two 
Presidents in power before this case was tried were Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the 
authors of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, which espoused the importance of States 
rights, and the need for states to nullify actions of the federal government which they found to 
be unconstitutional. Furthermore, their party, the Democratic Republicans, won a decisive 
victory in 1816 and maintained power while the McCulloch was being tried, from which we 
can conclude that states rights were far more important to the average American than the 
powers of the federal government. Taken together, it becomes clear that John Marshall was 
furthering a political aim by expanding the power of the Federal government and diminishing 
states rights in McCulloch, again highlighting the mass public v elite conflict that has been so 
central to the courts history. This would serve as the foundation for the courts future 
politicization; once it became clear that the court could be used to enact policy change without 
having to worry about electoral repercussions, the way the court operated, and who comprised 
its membership, were fundamentally altered.  
 Marshall’s decisions came during some of the most uncertain times in American 
history. The young democracy lacked guidance, and it was up to leaders like the Chief Justice 
to create rules and precedents where there had been none before. Marshall took on such a 
politicized role in this period because he believed it was necessary for the institution, and the 
nation as a whole, to have a Supreme Court that was not limited in its ability to protect the 
principles laid out in the constitution. It was during America’s first real period of political 
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upheaval – the transition of power from federalist to Whigs – in which we see the beginning of 
the trend towards court politicization, and this would become a recurring pattern throughout 
American history. In periods where there is the most uncertainty in both the legislative and 
executive branches, political elites often view the judicial branch as a favorable alternative to 
congress and the President as they can bypass lawmakers and create new policy through their 
decisions. Thus, while the trend of politicization has been slowly increasing over time, we see 
the most salient surges during periods of upheaval in the United States, whether it be a 
transition of power, a war, or even a financial crisis.  
Part B: The Reconstruction System 
 After the Civil War, the American political system had to undergo a significant 
alteration. The trauma and destruction the war caused led to a significant reevaluation of the 
way government institutions functioned, including that of the Supreme Court. The Court’s 
reputation had been significantly damaged during the conflict, as many had seen its efforts to 
hold the government accountable as unfavorable to the war effort. For instance, when Lincoln 
suspendered the writ of Habeas Corpus, Chief Justice Roger Taney issued a ruling that Lincoln 
lacked the authority to undertake such an action – a decision that Lincoln flatly ignored. Thus, 
following decisions like this, Senators wanted to ensure that the decisions issued by the 
Supreme Court would be in their interest – the elite interest – and would not serve to undermine 
their efforts at reconstruction.  
 In this period, the court became regarded a purely political institution, the membership 
of which, senators believed, should be geographically dispersed and politically reliable 
(Friedman 1983). Again, we see the Court being used as a device for political change; in this 
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case it was used to protect the programs passed by the North and ensure that the United States 
survived one of the harshest periods in its existence. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the 
issues before the Court primarily related to war and Reconstruction, both of which were 
considered to be of crucial importance to the survival and character of the nation that Congress 
would often take steps to ensure the Court could not invalidate its laws. As Friedman indicates, 
the constitutional pressures of the period created a strong incentive to gain ideological control 
of the Court (Friedman 1983).  
 In this way, the Supreme Court became an extension of Congress during reconstruction, 
with its membership deliberately reflecting the ideological make up of the legislative branch so 
that policies that may have been challenged and found unconstitutional remained intact. This is 
clearly an example of the hijacking of the courts decision-making authority to enact substantive 
policy change in the United States, and this did not go without notice. The Court sank to a low 
level of esteem in the eyes of the public (Friedman 1983), as a plethora of statements of 
disrespect and hostility were leveled at the court for making decision that appeared to be flatly 
partisan, demonstrating that the American Public was not satisfied with the direction of the 
court, nor the way it had been employing its powers.  
 Similarly, we see a perverting of the nomination process in this period. To further 
guarantee that the Supreme Court would continue to deliver decisions that were considered to 
be acceptable by congress, Senators demanded that nominees to the Supreme Court had 
orthodox views on issues relating to Reconstruction (Friedman 1983), in essence dismissing the 
notion that justices should be nonpartisan, preferring instead individuals who they knew would 
behave in the way they intended, which also made the courts decisions far less controversial in 
this period – as they were all but preordained. The use of a Reconstruction litmus test in this 
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period demonstrates that the political elite in post civil war society recognized the Supreme 
Court was necessary to enact the changes they found necessary, and therefore politicized the 
judiciary and used it to advance political causes as it saw fit. This was far removed from what 
the mass public wanted, as it was rife with sectional tensions, and still reeling from the effects 
of the Civil War.  
 Moreover, positions on the court were given out to political allies, in recognition of 
service to the President, or the nation, and this was generally not seen as improper (Friedman 
1983). Again, we see that by expressly involving political actors in the Federal judiciary, it by 
definition ceases to become a nonpartisan body that exists above the fray of politics, but rather 
becomes a body expressly engaged in the political matters of the day. In doing some, the 
political classed deprived the common American of the protections the Judiciary was supposed 
to provide – if decisions were seen as against the national interest, they were essentially 
precluded by congress, eliminating the courts ability to protect the Constitution. 
 However, as the memory of the Civil War waned, and issues relating to reconstruction 
began to disappear, the court regained some of its lost independence, and was able to become 
functioning separate from the political realm once more. This change, which coincided with a 
greater reliance on the Court’s role in society, bred a change in the way Justices were viewed. 
Towards the turn of the century, the importance of a “judicial temperament” came about, 
affording the President more political freedom in choosing his nominees, as well as diminishing 
the role the Senate played in judging the nominees ideology (Friedman 1983, 60). This new 
type of justice, unencumbered by political necessities, was able to act free of congressional 
constraints, which would produce the next great movement of judicial exploitation in American 
history.  
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 However, this ebb and flow of political contention over Supreme Court nominees that 
characterized the nineteenth century was due largely to the volatility of the system. An 
upheaval like the Civil War is unprecedented in American history, and enacting reconstruction 
policies was one of the most difficult tasks in the history of the legislative branch. Thus, we see 
increasing levels of politicization as the Court becomes a more promising alternative to the 
status quo of legislative gridlock. Again, while the trend of politicization is always upward 
rising, in periods such as these we see a greater reliance on the courts alternative ability as a 
policy making body and therefore more incentive to treat the court as a political institution.  As 
we saw with the early 1800’s and Marshall, trends of politicization increase in periods of 
political and institutional disruption and change; however, it is remarkable that given such a 
shock to the system, the ways in which the political elite interacted with the Judiciary changed 
comparatively little. Again, this demonstrates that through the evolution of American 
institutions and values, court politicization remains a constant.  
Part C: The Era of Sociological Jurisprudence 
 At the turn of the century, there was a fundamental change in the way Supreme Court 
Justices began to view the constitution. Before, Justices had decided cases based upon what 
they believed the Constitution could allow, with varying degrees therein, but the logic of each 
decision was always couched in Constitutional doctrine. However, this new epoch of American 
jurisprudence would be marked by a type of decision-making that at its core was a device of 
political change. 
 The concept that is embodied in sociological jurisprudence is that the courts can change 
the meaning of the Constitution at will by altering their interpretation of the document, with the 
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goal being to keep up with the views of the dominant group in society (Secola 1988). In this 
way, the Constitution is not as important as the prevailing social and political climate, as 
Justices view it as their obligation to ensure the Constitution reflects modern society. While 
John Marshall used the Court as an instrument of change, to both bolster and enhance the 
powers of the federal government and the judiciary, his decisions reflected what he believed the 
Constitution would allow; they never went so far as to reflect what direction he perceived 
society to be headed. In this way, such a judicial philosophy would have been anathema to 
Marshall, as it would “nullify the written Constitution and make the Supreme Court's power 
unlimited” (Secola 1988, 30). 
 The Justice most associated with the philosophy of Sociological Jurisprudence is Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who sat on the Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932. For Justice Holmes, 
the law was not a set principle to be read and understood; instead it was dynamic and ultimately 
a method of achieving progress (Secola 1998, 34). However, the issue with Sociological 
Jurisprudence is that, when applied through the powers of Judicial Review, it turns the Supreme 
Court from a judgmental body into a policy making body, which is an idea that is derided by 
the majority of the American populace. When the Court can interpret the Constitution 
according to what the Court perceives to be the dominant group of society, it has a free hand to 
institute its policy preferences on the people of the United States, thereby surpassing the will of 
the people as represented by Congress and the President. Additionally, because Justices are 
appointed and have lifetime tenure, this means that members of the Supreme Court have 
nothing to fear in terms of electoral repercussions for their actions.  
 Ultimately, this represents one of the clearest abuses of the Supreme Court for political 
purposes. While Sociological Jurisprudence purports to adhere to the opinions of the dominant 
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groups of society, it ultimately disregards the wishes of the American people while doing so. 
The political elites that comprise the court were not elected, and therefore did not genuinely 
speak for the people of the United States; rather they were using their positions to institute 
changes that they found to be necessary, regardless of the opinions of the American people. In 
this sense, the Court abandons its policing function, whereby they ensure there were no acts of 
overreach by the other two branches of government, and in essence bypasses the legislature and 
the executive to make the constitution reflect their version of society. It is evident that acting in 
this way was not only anathema to the American people, but would have been anathema to the 
scores of Justices who had come before.   
 
 As you can see in Figure 1, the usage of the phrase “Sociological Jurisprudence jumps, 
staring in the early 1900’s and hitting a peak in the early 1920’s, and another in the early 
1930’s, both under Justice Holmes tenure. However, we also see a rise in the number of times 
the phrase “legislating from the bench” is used in this period. Referring to figure 2 (below), 
there is a similar spike in the usage of this this phrase in the early 1920’s, lasting until after 
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Holmes left the Court in the early 1930’s, showing a slight correlation between the two. This 
phrase has an inherently negative connotation, and demonstrates that, in this period, the 
increased amount of judicial activism that took place under justice Holmes and other advocates 
of Sociological Jurisprudence was in fact received negatively by the American people, 
indicating the agenda the Court was pursuing ran counter to what average American citizens 
believed the court should be engaging in. Once more, this shows the fundamental disconnect 
between the mass public and the political elite on the way the judicial branch operates, with the 
Supreme Court again being used 
to further political agendas by certain powerful individuals.  
 It is also in this period that we see Roosevelt’s famous court packing scheme, in which 
the President attempted to alter the size of the court so that justices would continue to uphold 
his New Deal programs that he felt were paramount to American in the aftermath of the Great 
depression. A series of 5 to 4 decisions that had gone against the Roosevelt administration had left 
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Democrats throughout the country looking for a way to restrain the court and ensure that the 
decisions delivered by the highest court in the country would be both predictable, and favorable to 
the Roosevelt coalition. This led to the belief that the Court could be curbed with an act of 
congress, in essence stripping the Court of its independence and diluting its ability to rule against 
policies the President and Congress believed were wholly legitimate (Leuchtenburg 1966). 
Ultimately, the plan would never be put into action as the famous “switch in time that saved nine” 
would give Roosevelt a much needed legal victory, but the Court Reform Bill that Roosevelt sought 
to pass was a blatant example of the politicization of the Supreme Court by the political classes. 
The normative purpose of the Supreme Court, to protect the citizens of the United States, was 
almost explicitly undermined in order to further the political agenda of the individuals in power. 
This was one of the most widely criticized moments of Roosevelt’s administration, as infringing 
upon the sovereignty of the court is viewed as detrimental to democracy, and this is likely why it 
has never been attempted again in the decades following. Additionally, the unpopularity of the plan 
serves as a testament to the fact that it was a self-serving policy intended to facilitate policy change 
for the president and members of his cabinet. 
 During this period of institutional change, the level of politicization of the court reached a 
new zenith. In this circumstance the judiciary was threatening to derail a legislative agenda that was 
seen as integral to the recovery of the United States during the Great Depression, and this directly 
correlates with the increase politicization. Similarly to the two previous examples of the first 
transition of political parties (from federalist to Democratic Republican), and the Civil War, the 
Great Depression was a watershed moment in American history. As these examples prove, during 
periods of high institutional stress or crisis, the Supreme Court represents continuity and can be 
used to bypass turmoil in the elected branches of government to enact policy reform. In this case, 
the President’s attempts to pack the court represented an effort to dilute the Court’s authority in 
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order to prevent the New Deal policies from being declared unconstitutional. Controlling the court 
became a priority of the Roosevelt administration, creating a greater incentive to politicize the court 
so that its decisions would be more predictable and would see the New Deal policies in a more 
favorable light. Thus, while the process of court politicization has been incremental throughout 
Americana history, the largest spikes are correlated with moments of high stress in the system.  
 Sociological jurisprudence however, would not be abandoned as the infamous court-
packing plan had been, and the United States would see similar activist tactics used by the 
Warren Court during the 1950’s and 1960’s. The Warren Court was one of the most Liberal 
Courts in history and truly revolutionized the rights everyday American’s were given at this 
period in time, though large portions of the population took issue with the Warren Court’s 
apparent activism. Though many of the Warren Courts decisions had massive significance for 
certain groups of Americans, public opinion repudiated the Warren Court’s style of activism 
(Luban 1999). As a liberal court, Warren and the associate Justices of the court took the 
opportunity to use the judiciary as a way of bypassing the slow legislative progress of Congress 
and the President to put in place fundamental rights they believed all were entitled to, including 
decisions related to voting rights, desegregation, and criminal rights. I do not endeavor to 
decide whether these decisions were right or wrong, however, it is clear that this is yet another 
example of the Political class using the Supreme Court as a body to institute definitive policy 
change throughout the United States, in spite of what public opinion said about their actions. 
Indeed most everyone now agrees that judicial activism and that judicial restraint is preferable, 
with some going so far as to suggest that the Warren Courts decisions should be ignored 
(Luban 1999).  
 Earl Warren and his colleagues were pursuing a rights revolution and obviously used 
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their positions of power to further these aims. Ostensibly, their decisions have had a positive 
impact on American society, but at the time they was an incredibly large movement against the 
Supreme Court. A campaign was started to impeach Earl Warren (See figure 3 below) resulting 
from the widespread outcry against the Warren Court’s decisions, again indicating that there 
was a disconnect between the agenda being pursued by the elites occupying the Supreme Court, 
and the general public who felt the Court was overstepping its bounds. 
 
 Once again, this instance on politicization came during an instance of discord and 
dissonance within the American system. During Warren’s tenure, the country was locked in the 
midst of intense debate over issues that were highly controversial at the time, namely 
segregation, civil rights, and the rights of those accused of or convicted of crimes. Unlike the 
past examples, this upheaval was caused by domestic discontent, rather than a war or a 
financial crisis. However, this period was rife with partisanship and gridlock, again making the 
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court a favorable alternative for putting new policies in place. Not only did the Warren Court 
act in a highly political matter, groups like the NAACP chose to use litigation to end 
discriminatory policies like school segregation as the individuals involved in the organization 
knew their efforts would have fallen on deaf ears in Congress. Using the court’s ability to 
establish precedents as an alternative to the deliberative processes of the legislative and 
executive is yet another example of the court being politicized during times of political 
upheaval to further the agenda of the political elite.  
Part D: The History of Modern Politicization 
 Perhaps the most salient example of the politicization of the Supreme Court came 
during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan. In 1987, Robert Bork was nominated to fill a seat on 
the Supreme Court, and in this instance, there was a massive campaign launched to halt Bork 
from ever taking a seat on the Supreme Court, though this campaign was different from that of 
Clarence Thomas who would later be successfully confirmed. In Thomas’ case, a scandal was 
the reason so much opposition had been generated, but in the case of Bork, it was his ideology 
that alarmed the Senators who held the fate of his nomination in their hands.  
 Many scholars have argued that the Bork nomination and ultimate rejection was a 
watershed moment for Supreme Court politics. The main change to the judicial nominating 
process was that the sole basis for the candidate’s rejection was his political viewpoints, rather 
than his qualifications, though at the time of the hearings, the argument was made that the 
selection process had already been politicized before the senators even saw Bork. (Rose 1989). 
For a branch of government that was supposed to be immune from questions of partisanship 
and ideology, this was certainly the first time it had come up in confirmation hearings in the 
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twentieth century. 
 However, the Senate has long judged candidates for the Supreme Court on the basis of 
what they believe, as rejections of Supreme Court nominees in the nineteenth century were 
often political but almost never expressly ideological (Danelski 1989, 920), whereas in this 
instance they were expressly political. However, in addition to rejecting Bork because of his 
ideology, there were other political aims at play when the Senate rejected Bork to fill the seat 
left by Justice Lewis Powell – namely that Powell was the courts median and was the swing 
vote on cases that were split 4-4. In fact, many liberal activists and politicians feared that the 
appointment of a Reagan conservative like Judge Bork could potentially push the courts 
median far to the right, resulting in a significantly conservative court for the next several 
decades (Blasecki 1990, 531).  
 Though, in the mobilization of resources against Judge Bork, we again see the conflict 
between the political class and the mass public play out. Recognizing that the court is an 
instrument for policy change, liberal law makers attempted to obstruct the Republicans from 
getting a stronger ideological majority on the court, for they realized this would set back their 
policy aims. It becomes evident that this was the grounds for Bork’s rejection, as in 1981, when 
the American Bar Association (ABA) provided its recommendation for Bork to sit on United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, it unanimously provided the 
Judiciary Committee with its highest approval rating for federal circuit or district court 
nominees – a rating of  “exceptionally well qualified” (Myers III 1989, 402). Bork was then 
confirmed by a unanimous voice vote and received his commission as a federal judge. No 
significant opposition was raised to Bork at this point, simply because his appointment was less 
salient and his position gave him less power, and for this reason the political elite did not need 
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to oppose him in the grandiose way they did when he was nominated to the Supreme Court 
seven years later, when he again received the highest approval rating from the ABA (Myers III 
1989). 
 It is evident that the public did not have as strong an opinion on Judge Bork as the 
political classes did, as they saw him as a speed bump in the process of achieving policy change 
through litigation. Lobbyists and interest groups had to spend incredibly large sums of money 
to win the public over and prime them into believing that opposing Judge Bork was the right 
course of action, so that they could successfully prevent a Conservative from undoing legal 
precedents liberal activists had worked so hard to put in place. Indeed there were interest 
groups fighting to get Bork confirmed, with both sides engaging in included newspaper 
advertisements, television ads, mass mailing campaigns, enlistment of prominent public figures 
to endorse or discredit the nomination, letters to newspaper editors and editorials, public 
opinion polls, public rallies and protests, bumper stickers, lapel buttons, petitions, charges, and 
counter- charges (Myers III 1989, 406).  
 Moreover, interest groups used special tactics to convince certain sectors to oppose the 
Bork nomination, using the lenses of racial equality and gender bias to induce individuals to 
call their Senators in opposition to Bork (Litchman 1989, 978-79). What becomes abundantly 
clear is that public opinion in this case was hijacked through extensive lobbying efforts and 
smear campaigns, and made to reflect the wishes of the liberal activists who were opposing 
Bork simply to prevent the capture of the Supreme Court by Conservatives. The average 
American had no problem with Bork when he was nominated to be a federal judge seven years 
before, nor did they oppose him when he was initially nominated. However, the outrage only 
appeared when it became political relevant for the group of politicians and activists who sought 
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the continued usage of the Supreme Court as an instrument of policy development in the United 
States. Furthermore, most Americans do not want an ideological Supreme Court, as Luban 
suggested, indicating that most Americans would have preferred a less controversial 
confirmation process in which Senators made their decisions based on a nominees 
qualifications and previous judgments rather than on his or her ideological or political stances 
on certain issues.  
 Referring to Figure 4 (below) however, it becomes clear that the case of Judge Bork 
was in fact a watershed moment in the Court’s history. The blue point on the line represents the 
year in which the Bork nomination and subsequent rejection took place. Using a linear 
regression, it is apparent that, following the Bork incident, the margin of confirmation of every 
subsequent justice has continued to shrink, to the point that some modern nominees do not even 
receive hearings, indicating an enhanced importance of ideology in the process of being 
successfully confirmed as a justice of the Supreme Court. This reveals a worrying trend, 
showing that the government’s least political branch in theory, has actually become on of its 
most political branches in practice.  
 This period marks the beginnings of the current system of Supreme Court nominations, 
characterized by bitter partisan fights and threats to derail or indefinitely forestall the 
confirmation of nominees. The level of political upheaval during this era of American politics 
was comparatively low, making the severe politicization of the Court during the Bork hearings 
somewhat surprising. It was also in this moment that we see a departure from the previous 
pattern, demonstrating that court politicization had moved from an extreme measure to a far 
more commonplace behavior. Decades of politicizing the court, through moments of political 
upheaval and moments of institutional stagnation led to a normalization of these type of tactics 
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by the political elite.  
 
 This brings the story to modern times, where the political elite blatantly uses political 
and ideological measures to determine who sits on the court, and where those on the court 
pursue political aims through the auspices of judicial activism to enact policy without ever 
being elected to serve as a legislator. Scholars have hypothesized how an Obama court with a 
liberal majority might be able to enact both legal and legislative change in the United States, 
indicating that would make only incremental changes to the current legal framework, at most 
reversing some of the Roberts Court’s recent controversial and closely-divided cases (Robinson 
2010). 
 The ideologically motivated obstruction of Obama’s nominee to fill Antonin Scalia’s 
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seat on the Supreme Court was what motivated this paper, but when the key points in the courts 
history are examined over time, it becomes obvious that there are two separate and distinct 
groups when it comes to the Judiciary branch and the way it should be operate; the first being 
the political elite, who see the judiciary as a vehicle for policy change in either the liberal or 
conservative direction, whereas the second, the American public, is more concerned with the 
court functioning efficiently and remaining nonpartisan. The second part of this paper seeks to 
find empirical evidence that this pattern still exists in modern America, namely that the 
American people would prefer Antonin Scalia’s seat on the Supreme Court swiftly filled with 
an individual qualified to fill the post, rather than the partisan squabbling and bickering that has 
taken place under the administrations of both President Obama and now under the 
administration of President Trump.   
Part E: Fitting into Larger Trends 
 As one can see, through a multitude institutional and structural changes to the American 
system, politicization of the court has remained a constant theme and has steadily increased as 
time has passed, until present day where it has reached new partisan extremes. However, 
examples of court politicization persisted in spite of electoral shifts in the population at large.  
  Famous American political Scientist Walter Dean Burnham argued that throughout 
American history, there were several so-called “critical elections,” which were elections 
resulting in critical realignments, or abrupt coalitional change among the mass-based electorate 
(Burnham 1970). These realigning elections are spread across the country’s 200 plus year 
existence, starting with Jefferson’s Presidential victory in 1800 and ending with Roosevelt’s 
election in 1932, though several post modern example have been hypothesize including 
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Reagan’s election, or that of Lyndon Johnson in 1968.  
 In each of these occasions, there have been serious changes in the mass electorate that 
have brought about different voting coalitions, which in turn carry politicians to power. What is 
striking, then, is that despite these various changes in the mass public throughout the period 
analyzed by this paper, there has been very little variance in the ways in which political elites 
have conducted themselves in regards to the Supreme Court. When all the events in this paper 
are overlaid on a timeline with the critical elections Burnham discusses in his book, it is evident 
that instances of elites utilizing the court to further their agendas are not localized to one or two 
periods in time, but rather are found consistently throughout the timeline.  
 This gives credence to this papers main argument, that there has in fact been a 
disconnect between the mass public and the political elites that has existed throughout 
American history, becoming more intense during the latter half of the twentieth century and 
moving into the twenty-first century. Consequently, this means that despite significant changes 
in the institutional structure of the nation, in the nature of the political elite, and in the 
electorate, court politicization remained constant. 
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 In this way, this timeline demonstrates that this divide is persistent and therefore worthy 
of further study, bringing this paper to its second part: the collection of empirical data to 
validate these findings in the modern era. Given the patterns that have been traced thus far, it is 
expected that the data will reflect and lend support to the main arguments that have been 
developed utilizing evidence from various epochs of American history.  
PART II: CASE STUDY OF MODERN AMERICAN NOMINATION POLITICS 
Research Design 
 This research focuses on two key questions: how do the American people feel about the 
appointment of the next Supreme Court Justice and how different are these opinions from the 
actions we have seen from the political classes in the United States, namely the Senators and 
activists who have pushed for or against the confirmation of a nominee. The two hypotheses of 
this paper that follow are that A) the American public will prefer a working Supreme Court 
(fully populated) to one that more closely represents their ideology and B) that the view of the 
American public differs greatly from the political class when it comes to evaluating who should 
sit on the Supreme Court, regardless of the ideology or the political party of the respondent.  
 In order to gather data to test these hypotheses, a survey will be utilized, asking 
respondents a variety of questions on their feelings toward the Supreme Court and the 
nomination process, including some normative questions about how the Court should function. 
Additional demographic questions were also asked, to allow for the controlling of certain 
variables like political affiliation and self-identified ideology.  
 Furthermore, no questions are being submitted to United States Senators of activists for 
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several reasons, one of which is that Senators are incredibly busy and getting them to actually 
take this survey would be incredibly difficult. However, there are a multitude of statements 
made on the record by Senators showing why they believed that Judge Merrick Garland should 
not have received any hearings, or why they believe they should filibuster the nomination of 
Judge Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. From these statements, as well as the extraordinary 
actions taken over the past year and a half, it can be inferred what the position of the United 
States Senate is, and in this way, the responses can be compared to a baseline. This will allow 
us to test the second hypothesis, and compare the positions of the American public as well as 
the political class.  
 The survey was conducted using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk), an online 
service that allows researchers to quickly obtain responses for a low cost. As an undergraduate 
student, it is an incredibly expedient and convenient way to obtain results and test hypotheses. 
The system allows participants sign up to complete specific tasks for other people that have 
been uploaded to the website, a common one of which is taking a survey. The participants get 
paid small amounts for the tasks they complete, giving them an incentive to complete the tasks 
to the best of their ability. Through this service, approximately 500 responses to the survey 
were obtained.  
 However, it must be stated that several biases in these results may exist for several 
reasons. Firstly, through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service, samples tend to draw from more 
Democratic and Independent populations. Additionally, because this service is catered to 
people who have computers and are technologically savvy, the respondents are generally 
younger and more educated than the average adult population, which might have skew the 
results obtained by this survey. Thirdly, racial discrepancies may exist in the data, though these 
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differences may be exogenous to the model and the service being utilized to obtain results. 
However, in spite of all these potential biases, by adding demographic questions about 
partisanship, ideology, educational attainment, and race, it becomes possible to control for 
these potential confounders, allows the results to paint a more clear picture of trends in the 
population at large (Buhrmester et al. 2011).  
Data Presentation & Analysis 
 
Part a: 2016 Data 
 
 I had previously done survey research into this phenomenon, with a sample of roughly 
225 individuals throughout the United States and had found evidence of the elite v mass public 
divide that this paper has attempted to prove the existence of. Early in 2016, during the stand 
off over then President Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, two survey questions were used to 
see what Americans wanted in a Supreme Court Justice. The results showed that the majority of 
Americans wanted a Justice who was nonideological, rather than one who was explicitly 
partisan and decided issues based upon political calculations. This held true regardless of 
political party, with the differences between individuals of the Democratic and Republican 
Party being statistically insignificant, indicating that the true population means of both parties 
are in fact equal. With a P value of almost 0.21, it is highly likely that the differences between 
democrats and republicans on this issue was the result of sampling error, rather than some 
substantive difference that existed within the population. This proves that, at least in part, the 
American people prefer a nonpartisan judiciary, departing from what we frequently see in 
Senate hearings, where ideological litmus tests are often used to gauge whether a nominee is fit 
to serve or not. These data suggest that there is in fact a divide between average Americans that 
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currently exists, showing that the pattern exhibited within this paper is one of the most 
important judicial legacies of American history.  
 Type of Justice Preferred: Ideological 
Type of Justice 
Preferred: 
Nonideological 
Marginal Row 
Totals 
Democrats 32   (35.25)   [0.3] 66   (62.75)   [0.17] 98 
Republicans 18   (14.75)   [0.72] 23   (26.25)   [0.4] 41 
Marginal Column 
Totals 50 89  
 Chi2 Statistic = 1.5883 P value = .207575  
 
 This question spoke to the normative side of the Supreme Court, namely, how it should 
function in practice. The results then, are unsurprising; in terms of how the Supreme Court 
should be viewed objectively, Americans do not differ in the way they perceive the Court’s 
function, or purpose, however, does this pattern hold true when the subject matter becomes 
more subjective, i.e. more partisan in nature?  
 Consequently, when a question of ideological substance was asked, ostensibly the 
results showed significant differences between Democrats and Republicans. On the question of 
whether the Senate had a constitutional obligation to hold hearings on Merrick Garland, 
surprisingly, a majority of both Democrats and Republicans agreed that the Senate did in fact 
have an obligation to hold hearings on the President’s nominee, which would seem to 
contradict the public stances of the Republican leadership in the Senate and on the Senate 
judiciary committee. However, raw numbers are not evidence enough that there is a group 
consensus, as the number of self-identified Republicans who answered this question was 
relatively low (to be expected on Mechanical Turk), potentially biasing the results. To correct 
for this, another Chi Square test is conducted.  
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 When a Chi square is run on the second question, it becomes clear that there is in fact a 
statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republicans on this more partisan-
specific question.  
 
 Constitutional Obligation: Agree 
Constitutional 
Obligation: Disagree 
Marginal Row 
Totals 
Democrats 63   (57.86)   [0.46] 4   (9.14)   [2.89] 67 
Republicans 13   (18.14)   [1.45] 8   (2.86)   [9.21] 21 
Marginal Column 
Totals 76 12 88 (Grand Total) 
 Chi2 Statistic = 14.011 P value =  .000182  
 
This Chi-Square had to be altered however, as each cell did not have more than five responses, 
so to account for this potentially compromising fact, a small alteration must be made to ensure 
these data accurately reflect trends in the greater population – the Yates Correction. When this 
Chi Square is altered with the Yates Correction, to take into account the low number of 
Democrats who believed the Senate did not have a constitutional obligation to hold hearings on 
the nomination of Merrick Garland, the Chi Square statistic is lowered a bit to 11.416 with the 
p value equaling 0.0007.  
Q2: Chi Square Value (Yate’s Correction adjusted) Q2: P Value (Yate’s Correction adjusted)) 
Chi2 Statistic = 11.416 P value = 0.0007 
 
From these statistics it is clear that Democrats and Republicans do differ significantly on this 
question, as should be expected because this particular question speaks directly to an 
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individual’s party identifiers, which are incredibly strong predictors of the ways in which an 
individual considers issues of political salience. The authors of The American Voter Revisited 
(Lewis-Beck et al. 2014, 22-23) equate ideology to a perceptual screen that affects the ways in 
which we view the world, and in this instance, that is undoubtedly the case.   
 So from these data taken during the Obama administration, several points become clear. 
Firstly, in regard to broad, normative questions that ask how the court should function, these 
data suggest the American public is fairly united, as most believe the judiciary should remain 
nonpartisan and there is not a statistic significant difference between Republicans and 
Democrats. However on the Contrary, on questions more tailored to recent events and anchored 
in party affiliation, the American public seems to be far more divided. While more Republicans 
in this sample did say they believed the Senate had a duty to hold hearings on the President’s 
nominee, the miniscule size of the sample means indicates that sampling error or other biases in 
the ways in which the sample was constructed could have easily produced these results. 
Though, the differences between Republicans and Democrats on this question are far more 
enlightening – they reveal that on questions of political salience, there is a fundamental 
difference between the way Democrats and Republicans feel. While this may seem like a 
glaringly obvious result, will this dichotomy hold true in the current, larger dataset taken during 
the Trump administration? And more importantly, on issues of the judiciary, does the gap 
between the mass public and the political elite still exist, or has there been a convergence as of 
late? These are all questions the new dataset will help to answer.  
 It is entire plausible, however, that political demographics may have completely shifted 
since this earlier sample was taken. The tumultuous Presidential election campaign of 2016 
seemed to defy the odds and break with tradition at every turn, resulting in what some experts 
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refer to as the greatest political upset of all time. President Trump is unique in his ability to 
galvanize and energize his supporters behind causes that he advocates for, meaning that his 
nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch and his public push to have his nomination confirmed may 
have altered the dynamics on this issue. This is another possibility that we may see reflected in 
the data collected during Trump’s presidency.  
Part B: 2017 Data 
Methods 
 As previously stated, the survey was conducted online using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk, and the survey was restricted so that only users based in the United States were allowed 
to take the survey, so as to eliminate the biases of foreign nationals who would damage the 
generalizability of the final results.  
 Using Mechanical Turk, survey data was collected from 500 individuals on a variety of 
topics relating to the Supreme Court. The release of the survey was coordinated with the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s hearings so that news of the Supreme Court’s nomination process would 
be highly salient, therefore increasing the likelihood respondents were adequately informed 
about the material covered in the survey. Additionally, respondents would be more likely to be 
familiar with Judge Neil Gorsuch, Trump’s pick to fill the seat left by Antonin Scalia’s death, 
eliminating some of the potential biases of the survey.  
 In order to ensure that respondents completed the survey, they were given a code at the 
end which they had to input into mechanical Turk to receive payment for their efforts on the 
website. The survey was kept completely anonymous so as to limit the possibility exposing 
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potentially sensitive personal data. Users were told that they could quit the survey at any 
moment and that if they did not feel comfortable answering a particular question that they 
could simply skip that particular question and move on.  
Demographic Breakdown 
 Preliminary data from the survey showed that of the 500 respondents, some 220 
identified themselves as Democrats, with 158 identifying as Independents and another 122 
identifying as Republicans. Converting to percentages, this tells us that approximately a quarter 
of the sample is Republican, while forty-four percent were Democrats and around thirty-one 
percent identified as political Independents. Using the seven-point scale for ideologies, the 
survey shows the sample is roughly fifty-one percent liberal, eighteen percent independent, and 
thirty percent conservative. According to a Gallup poll conducted in 2016, forty-two percent of 
Americans identified as political independents, twenty-nine percent identified as Democrats, 
and twenty-six percent identified as Republicans. The validity of the measures is up for debate, 
using this data as a baseline, this particular sample contains less than the average amount of 
independents and Republicans, while overweighting Democrats, which is consistent with 
samples collected from Turk.  
 Additionally, roughly eighty percent of the sample was White or Caucasian, while four 
percent identify as Hispanic, six percent identify as Asian, and seven percent identify as 
African American or Black. According to the US Census, around seventy percent of the United 
States is White, while Asians account for approximately six percent, African Americans for 
roughly thirteen percent, and some seventeen percent are Hispanic or Latino, indicating this 
sample is overly White and largely underrepresents African Americans and Latinos.  
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 The average age of respondents was 38.7 years of age, with a minimum age of eighteen 
and a maximum age of eighty-six, indicating a fairly young sample, though decently 
heterogeneously distributed. Additionally, the sample was forty-four percent women and fifty-
five percent men, with the remainder of individuals preferring not to specify. Furthermore, on 
average, respondents had roughly fifteen and a half years of schooling, meaning the majority of 
respondents were nearly college educated. 
 This confirms most of the biases that are frequently seen with mechanical Turk, and 
ultimately this could impact the results of the research. However, the assumption is that on 
certain normative questions about the courts purpose, an individual’s personal partisanship 
should have very little bearing on the way that person responded to the question, as the 
assumption is this will be uniform across political affiliations.  
Data Analysis & Discussion: 
Questions 1 – 4: 
 The first four question in the survey were all open ended questions, asking individuals 
to input a value between zero and one hundred as a way of ascertaining their opinions about the 
functions of the Supreme Court, and interval level data was utilized so these results could be 
more easily compared with one another and so that the outcomes of each statistical test would 
have greater generalizability.  
 Two of the questions focused on the individual, asking if it is important that the court 
protect the values they care about, and if it is important that the court makes decisions they 
agree with. The remaining two questions asked if it was important that the court functioned 
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properly, and if it was important that any vacant seats on the court be filled so that it can 
operate effectively. According to hypothesis A, we would expect lower values on the first two 
feeling thermometers when compared with the results of the other two questions, which 
focused on the courts ability to fulfill its obligations. A full list of survey questions can be 
found in Appendix A. 
 Ultimately, the data confirms the first hypothesis, with the average response to the 
questions focusing on the importance of the court’s ability to adequately execute its function 
exceeding that of the more individual centered questions. Individuals felt the least important 
aspect of the Supreme Court was that it made decisions they agreed with, followed by the court 
protecting the values the individuals cared about. The two questions designed to ascertain how 
important individuals felt a fully functioning court is, however, outscored the two previous 
categories and virtually tied, with a score of 70.53 and 70.74 respectively. Interestingly, this 
was not much higher than the response to question number one, which asked if the court 
protected the values the individual cared about, which was an average response of 69.18.  
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 When these means are compared using a difference of means test, it becomes clear that 
we must retain the null hypothesis for the difference in average between question one and 
questions two and four. The average difference between question one and two was a paltry 1.35 
points and resulted in a significance level of 0.3821, far larger than the 0.05 cut off, whereas 
the average difference between question one and question four was only 1.56, with a 
significance level of 0.3615, again largely insignificant. Therefore, the difference observed 
between the two averages can be attributed to sampling error or some other bias that exists 
within the sample, so the null hypothesis is retained. This indicates that in terms of importance, 
it is unclear which of these attributes Americans find most important, somewhat contradicting 
the theory postulated in hypothesis A.  
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 On the other hand where there is a statistically significant difference is between 
question three and the remaining three questions. The average difference in responses between 
question three and question four was 8.72 points, resulting in a significance level of less than 
0.01, indicating this difference is highly significant and therefore represents a concrete 
difference that exists in the population at large. The story is the same between question two and 
question three, resulting in an average difference of 8.51 and significance level of below .01 as 
well, and between question one and question three, which produced an average difference of 
7.15, and a significance level below .01. A complete set of statistics for each difference can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 These results indicate that Americans do believe a functioning court, and a fully 
populated court are significantly more important than a court that makes decisions the 
individual agrees with, again validating hypothesis A. However, unexpectedly, individuals on 
average indicated that the court protecting the values they care about was roughly as important 
(or more important given our retention of the null hypothesis) as an efficient or effect Supreme 
Court, which detracts from the hypothesis as it indicates some personal bias could be 
potentially more important than having a functioning court. The hypothesis expected that, 
normatively, a fully operational court would represent a greater good and would therefore be 
more important than a personal belief, but in this case that holds untrue.  
 Moving on to hypothesis B, the sample was broken down and separated by political 
affiliation, into Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. This was done so that the average 
score for each question could be compared across parties, giving a clearer picture on how these 
values fluctuate as you manipulate the variable of party identification. According the 
hypothesis B, this should show that regardless of party affiliation, the American public is 
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different than the political elites in respect to these questions. Again, as no political elites were 
surveyed, the differences are drawn from public statements and actions taken by politicians, 
jurists, and activists across the nation. The results can be found in the graph below.  
 
 The pattern exhibited in the whole population is maintained when examine the averages 
for each party affiliation on each question. The only exception comes on question one, where 
Republicans said on average it was more important than all of the other questions, which 
departs from the previously observed trend. This data would appear to validate hypothesis B, as 
regardless of political party, we consistently see the highest scores coming on question two and 
four, with question one following in a close third and question three coming in a somewhat 
distant forth. Moreover, these data prove there is more support for filling the courts vacant seat 
than politicians in the Senate would have the American people believe, as average thermometer 
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scores of 65 or above indicate a perhaps mild desire to fill Scalia’s seat. Yet, the Senate took 
extreme measures to ensure the seat would remain vacant until after the election – a blatantly 
partisan action that demonstrates the fundamental divide that exists between the American 
people and the political classes who occupy the legislature.  
 Additionally, the same pattern holds for each question, with Democrats rating the most 
highly, followed by independents, and then Republicans – a pattern frequently seen in the realm 
of American politics. Furthermore, as these data show, Democrats consistently indicated each 
question was more important than their Republican or Independent counterparts, and due to 
their overrepresentation within the sample, this likely drove up the national averages that were 
examined earlier.  
 When differences of means tests are conducting on these subsets of data, there is further 
support for both of the hypotheses of the paper. None of the differences between the 
Republican’s mean and the independent’s means achieve statistical significance, on any of the 
four questions. Furthermore, only two of the differences are indisputably significant, the 
difference between the Republican mean and Democratic mean on questions two and four, with 
both exceeding the .01 cutoff, indicating there is a 99% chance the results reflect a substantive 
difference. Four differences fall between a significance level of .05 and .01, and the remainder 
of the differences exceed a P value of .05, indicating those differences should be considered 
insignificant.   
 Ultimately, this is a mixed result, as there are a few concrete differences between 
Democrats and Republicans and Democrats and Independents, however several of the results 
display that there is not a significant difference in the ways members of various political 
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affiliations evaluate the importance of various aspects of the Supreme Court. While these 
results are not uniform, these similarities indicate there may not be as large of an ideological 
divide in the population as the news media or political party leaders would assert.  
Questions 5-9 
 The next series of questions generated either nominal or ordinal level data, and tried to 
hone in on individual’s opinions on specific aspects or individuals relating to the Supreme 
Court. The first question examined whether individuals believed that the Senate had a 
constitutional obligation to hold hearings on Obama’s nominee, judge Merrick Garland. The 
results were surprising given the developments that took place in the Senate in early 2016. 
 A majority of individuals stated that they either strongly agreed or agreed with the 
notion that the United States Senate had a constitutional obligation to hold hearings on Judge 
Merrick Garland – an action that both Majority leader Mitch McConnell and Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley indicated they had no responsibility to conduct. Nearly 
forty percent of individuals stated they strongly agreed, while just under twenty-eight percent 
agreed with the statement, in stark contrast with the five and seven percent who stated they 
disagreed or strongly disagreed, respectively. This would seem to suggest that again there is a 
disconnect between the American people and the political classes, while further validating the 
hypothesis that the public prefers a functioning court to one being used as a political tool. 
However, the significant number of Democrats in the sample means that this percentage could 
be artificially high, as ostensibly Democrats would be more likely than Republicans to support 
Judge Garland’s nomination to the Supreme Court. In order to get a clearer picture, the results 
were then again controlled for partisanship.  
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 Surprisingly, when political ideology is controlled for, a similar pattern emerges, with a 
majority of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans stating that they believed the Senate did 
in fact have an obligation to hold hearings for Obama’s nominee. There are sizable differences 
in the percent of individuals who said they strongly agreed, with fifty-one percent of Democrats 
strongly agreeing with the statement, compared to thirty-eight percent of independents and 
twenty-six percent of Republicans. While thirteen percent of Republicans indicated they 
strongly disagreed with the statement, this constitutes roughly half the amount that stated 
strongly in the affirmative – again an interesting result.  
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 These numbers show broad support across political parties, but in order to compare the 
percentage of those who agree to those disagree, the aggregate numbers of those who agreed 
and strongly agreed and those who disagreed and strongly disagreed were combined to form 
one category each to present a more clear picture regarding the proportions that were for and 
against hearings for Judge Merrick Garland. These proportions were then tested using a 
difference of proportions test to ascertain whether the results were statistically significant.   
 The results show that the difference between those who agree and those who disagree to 
be statistically significant, across all political parties (P < .01 for each). This result proves that a 
majority of Americans would have preferred Merrick Garland received hearings, regardless of 
that individual’s political party, which validates hypothesis B. Senate Republicans refused to 
 64 
even meet with Obama’s nominee, whereas a majority of the members of their party believed 
he should in fact have received hearings, once again demonstrating there is a fundamental 
disconnect between the way the American public and the political elite view issues surrounding 
the judiciary. The intense and bitter partisanship found in the U.S. Senate over Supreme Court 
nominations does not appear to exist throughout country, as the data indicates there is far more 
consensus then previously believed.  
 
 Given these results, we should find similar levels of consensus surrounding President 
Trump’s nominee before the court, Neil Gorsuch. Respondents were asked the exact same 
question, but Judge Gorsuch’s name replace judge Garland’s name. When these results were 
tabulated, unsurprisingly, the graph has a higher percentage of Republicans who strongly agree 
and a lower amount of Democrats who strongly agree, however on the whole, the pattern of 
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general agreement holds. In actuality, a larger percentage of total individuals surveyed believed 
the Senate has a constitutional obligation to hold hearings on Judge Gorsuch, which is 
surprising given the number of Democrats in this sample. Yet, this again proves that the 
American public is far less polarized on the issue of nominees than the members of the Senate 
are.  
 
 Furthermore, when the two graphs are superimposed upon one another, it becomes 
evident that the basic pattern holds. While there is a slight difference in magnitude, the only 
concrete difference we see is that there were more individuals who said they strongly disagreed 
that Judge Garland deserved hearings than disagree with the statement – a pattern that is flipped 
for Judge Gorsuch. While Democrats lack the Senate majority and therefore the ability to 
withhold hearings, it would appear there is broad national support for Judge Gorsuch.  
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 Once again, when political parties are controlled for, a majority of each political 
affiliation either agrees or strongly agrees with the notion that hearings should be held for 
Judge Gorsuch. While support for hearings is an imperfect proxy for support for a successful 
nomination, the mere fact that similar percentages of Democrats and Republicans are 
supporting hearings is illuminating, especially in this highly partisan and polarizing political 
environment. Moreover it shows consistency; regardless of ideology we see strong support for 
both nominees. This lends further support to hypothesis B, as there is very little difference 
between individuals who identified as Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, and 
furthermore, the support for hearings of an opposing parties nominee demonstrates that there is 
a legitimate difference between elected officials, who use the court to pursue policy change, 
and partisans in the greater population who are less diametrically opposed to nominees with 
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different ideologies.  
 
 When these were compressed into a simple agree/disagree dichotomy, the results are 
again statistically significant. The difference between the percentage of each political group 
that agreed with the statement far exceed the percentage that disagreed, with the P value 
exceeding the .01 cutoff in the positive direction. This proves the result are depicting an actual 
difference that exists within each group, proving that a demonstrable majority of Democrats, 
Republicans, and Independents supports hearings for judge Neil Gorsuch.  
 Additionally, if you run a difference of proportions test on the percentage of Democrats 
who agreed and the number of Republicans who agreed, the generated p value equals .1805, far 
above the 95% confidence cut off of .05, showing that there was not a statistically significant 
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difference in the way Democrats and Republicans answered this particular question, again 
reaffirming the existence of a bipartisan consensus on the issue of Supreme Court nominations 
in the public at large.  
 
 The next several questions however, do not provide evidence that supports the 
hypotheses laid out in this paper. The next two questions focus on the use of ideological litmus 
test when considering a nomination, and the possibility of utilizing a filibuster to temporarily 
(or permanently) block a nominee from reaching the federal bench. These two actions are 
frequently used (or threatened in the case of the filibuster) in nomination politics, so per the 
hypotheses, the expectation would be that the American public would disagree with the usage 
of such extreme or overtly partisan measures, as perhaps they erode the nonpartisan nature of 
what the nomination process is supposed to look like. Normatively, one would expect these 
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tactics to be anathema to the American public if they truly regarded the courts ability to 
function as a apolitical body higher than any personal biases about which individuals they 
would prefer see reach the Supreme Court. In this instance though, this is not the case.  
 In both examples, there is a fairly large percentage of the sample that said they found 
the use of litmus tests or a potential filibuster “sometimes acceptable,” or “always acceptable,” 
roughly fifteen percent more than those who indicated it was not acceptable in the case of the 
filibuster, whereas there is roughly a twenty-three percent difference in the case of litmus tests.  
 
 Given the earlier findings, this result is surprising as it contradicts previous trends and 
shows there are indeed similarities to the ways the political elite and the mass public view the 
usage of litmus tests or the filibuster. It is perhaps possible, however, that the large number of 
respondents who indicated that it would be sometimes acceptable to filibuster or use a litmus 
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test on a nominee intended there response to mean only in certain extreme circumstances. In 
this way, the question structure may have forced a response that did not adequately capture the 
specific opinion of the individual answering the question, though ultimately this is purely 
conjecture. 
 
This pattern seemingly holds when political affiliation is accounted for, as the majority 
of the responses tend to accumulate in the middle of the graph, with “sometimes acceptable” 
and “sometimes unacceptable” consistently garnering the most support, though at the same 
time, the answers in the affirmative consistently account for larger proportions of the total 
population than the answers in the negative.  
 Again, the wording in these questions could potentially contribute to biases in 
the responses, as it is not incredibly clear what the difference between sometimes acceptable 
 71 
and sometimes unacceptable is in practice. This ambiguity could have led to individuals 
mistakenly choosing one over the other, though ultimately I do not believe this completely 
biases the results as one would have expected the “Never Acceptable” answer to be far more 
popular than it was. That particular answer received anywhere between thirteen and twenty four 
percent of the choices cast, therefore proving that a large portion of the population believes the 
usage of these partisan tactics is at some time or another acceptable, which goes against the 
hypotheses earlier presented. 
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 When these are compressed into a simple two category evaluation, the difference in 
proportions of individuals who believed the filibuster and litmus test were acceptable were 
shown to be statistically significant for Independents and Democrats, but interestingly, not for 
Republicans (all data available in Appendix B). The reason for this is unclear, although it could 
be a reaction to attempts to use litmus tests or a filibuster against Judge Gorsuch to stymie his 
efforts of joining the Supreme Court, and in this way could be a partisan reaction. For 
independents and Democrats however, the data is clear, the difference between the percentage 
of both groups who believe it is acceptable/unacceptable is both sizable and significant (P value 
far less than .01). 
 The next question focused specifically on whether the vacant seat on the Supreme Court 
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should be filled – a straightforward question that should have been met with very little 
confusion. The results were very clear, with overwhelming numbers of individuals believing 
the seat should be filled, though taken broadly this is not a surprising result given the liberal 
slant of the sample. 
 
 As you can see from the data presented above, just over seventy percent of the sample 
wants the seat to be filled, and while this does not mean the answer would have been exactly 
the same one year ago, what it does show is that the majority of the American public does not 
believe Senate Democrats should indefinitely block Judge Gorsuch.  
 The data breakdown is almost exactly the same when it is split between parties, with 
even an overwhelming amount of Democrats supporting the filling of the vacant seat, again 
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showing that the American public holds significantly different views from the political elite 
who use the Supreme Court nomination process as an ideological tool to further a partisan 
agenda. These data support hypothesis A, as the American public seems to support a court that 
has all nine members, therefore giving it the ability to actually decide cases and avoid the four 
to four gridlock that has characterized decisions since Scalia’s death that lead to differences in 
court precedent across the country. This emphasis of functionality over ideology exactly 
validates the first hypothesis of this paper.  
 Secondly, these data also give support to hypothesis B, as there appears to be a 
disconnect between many of the party elites in the Senate who prefer brinksmanship and 
obstructionism when it comes to the President’s nominee. Moreover, this divide exists 
throughout the population regardless of the political affiliation of the individual, as large 
numbers of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents want the seat to be filled. Again, this 
seriously bolsters the claims made in hypothesis B, giving further support to this paper’s 
arguments.  
 75 
 
 Once more, these differences are statistically significant, proving that it is in fact true 
that large majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents want to see the seat filled. 
Unlike the last two questions, this particular question returns to the common theme of 
consensus amongst the American people, while there is a shockingly low amount of consensus 
amongst members of the United States Senate who differ ideologically. These results, taken in 
accordance with the bipartisan support for holding hearings on Judge Gorsuch seem to suggest 
more than moderate support for President Trump’s nominee in the population at large – 
arguably more than the sixty percent of the Senate that is needed to end a filibuster with a 
cloture motion. 
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Questions 10-14 
 Question nine focused on the role of the Supreme Court in government, and specifically 
on whether the court should remain apolitical unlike the other two branches of government. 
Given the hypotheses, the expected results would be that the majority of responses would say 
that it was extremely important or very important, as this was the intent of the designers of the 
American system of checks and balances. Ultimately, this was the result, as most of the 
responses indicated they believed it was increasingly important that the highest court in the 
nation remains outside of the political fray.  
 The “Extremely Important” category received forty-nine percent of responses, while the 
next most important category, “Very Important” received twenty-five percent of total 
responses. This result demonstrates yet another difference between the politicians and activists 
who place far more seriousness on selecting judges who will decide cases in a way that is 
consistent with their ideology. Additionally, by making ideology and partisanship a key part of 
the nomination process, the apolitical veil is destroyed, revealing an overtly political process.  
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 When these results are combined into three categories to present a more developed 
representation of what these results show, it becomes evident that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the percentages of individuals who stated the courts apolitical 
impartiality. Fully seventy-five percent of the sample indicated it was more important, while 
only seven percent stated they did not find it that important that the court remain separate from 
the every day politics that engulf the other two branches. While this doesn’t prove that the 
American public prefers a working Supreme Court, what it does show is that, based on the 
evidence presented here, the majority of American’s dislike the repeated politicization of the 
Supreme Court by the political elite.  
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 Again, these results hold when they are examined through the lens of individual 
partisanship, as these results hold for all groups surveyed. Over forty percent of Democrats, 
Republicans, and Independents stated that they believed it was extremely important the 
Supreme Court remained apolitical in modern times, while an additional twenty-two to thirty 
percent indicated they believed it was very important. On the contrary, five percent or less of 
each sample claimed that the courts apolitical impartiality was not at all important, with an 
additional five to seven percent saying that this was only slightly important. Lastly, fifteen to 
twenty percent indicated it was moderately important, though all of these data show that the 
court remaining apolitical is generally seen as more important than less important. To affirm 
the validity of this result, this graph was split into 3 categories – more important, moderately 
important, and less important.  
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 When these results are grouped into three smaller categories, the results could not be 
more clear. Sixty-five percent or more said that the court remaining a political was on the more 
important side while less than ten percent stated it was less important – an average difference of 
around fifty to sixty percent. Unsurprisingly, these results are highly significant, as confirmed 
by a difference of proportions test, which found that each difference cleared both the 0.05 and 
0.01 levels of significance. Therefore, as previously stated, it is a certainty that large 
percentages of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents favor an apolitical court – a 
departure from politicians and activists who are constantly trying to add partisan labels to 
nominees and further politicize the court to either further their own agenda or stymie their 
political opponents. Once more, this question provides evidence of a bipartisan consensus and 
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proves that there is a gulf of opinion that exists between average Americans and members of 
the political elite when it comes to questions centering on the court’s functionality and purpose.  
 
 Next, question eleven was intended to examine whether Americans believed it was 
acceptable to reject a nominee to the Supreme Court just because of his or her ideology alone. 
This would mean all other characteristics such as qualifications, personal history, and prior 
work history could potentially be ignored if the nominee’s opinions were perhaps too 
controversial. The motivation behind this question was the fairly famous case of Judge Bork, 
who was earlier discussed, a nominee who’s appointment failed largely because of his judicial 
philosophy and prior writings on certain key rights issues. During the Bork case, there was 
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significant mobilization of the American public, both for and against Judge Bork, though most 
of the lobbying was against his appointment to the Supreme Court. 
 Given the previous findings of this paper, one would expect the results of this question 
to be similar to that of the others, with most American’s finding the rejection of a nominee 
solely because of their ideology inappropriate or normatively wrong. However, given the recent 
trend of using a nominees ideology as grounds for rejection or significant opposition, it is 
possible that this behavior may have become normalized, which may be reflected in the data 
generated from question eleven.  
 
 Ultimately, in this example the latter was the case. According to these data we see 
“somewhat acceptable” receiving the most support, followed by “acceptable.” However, this 
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graph is far more normally distributed than any of those that have been previously presented, 
though it skews to the more acceptable side of the figure. This is an unanticipated result, given 
what has previously been found in this paper, as these results suggest somewhat broad support 
for rejecting a nominee based on ideology alone. Perhaps that the notion that judges with 
extreme ideologies being unfit to sit on the Supreme Court is not just partisan rhetoric designed 
to stall or prevent shift in power on the nine member body, but rather an accepted belief 
buttressed by a commonly held belief that exists in the American populace.  
 The picture becomes clearer when the answers are combined to form two categories, 
one each for acceptable and unacceptable. While the difference is far less pronounced than in 
previous questions, twenty-two percent more of the sample indicated that opposing a nominee 
based on their ideology alone was acceptable – no small margin. Indeed, this difference turns 
out to be statistically significant, directly calling into question some of the earlier results. The 
difference of proportions test yields a significance level of below 0.01, proving that this 
difference is statistically significant. However, given the biases in the data – specifically the 
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amount of Democrats – the potential remains that a certain demographics’ scores might be 
driving the overall trend. Given the current, pending nomination of Judge Gorsuch, it is 
possible that Democrats are stating it is more acceptable due to a partisan preconception of the 
judge.  
  When the results are broken down by party, it is difficult to discern any observable 
pattern amongst the data. Approximately a third of Democrats believe the rejection of a 
nominee to the Supreme Court because of ideology alone is “somewhat acceptable,” while 
nearly twenty-five percent of Independents believe the same type of behavior is “somewhat 
acceptable” or “acceptable.” On the other hand, twenty-five percent of Republicans believe the 
use of ideology as grounds for rejection of a nominee as “somewhat acceptable,” though 
twenty-two percent Republicans believe it is, on the contrary, “somewhat acceptable.” Overall, 
there is a large amount of variation within the sample, departing from previous trends of 
consensus and instead portraying a far more fractured, disharmonious American public. 
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 Further condensing the data into the same acceptable/unacceptable dichotomy as earlier, 
the data trends become much clearer. Out of all the groups, Democrats had the largest 
difference in support of use ideology alone as grounds for rejection, receiving thirty-five 
percent more responses indicating that it was acceptable. Additionally, sixty-five percent of 
independents said this was acceptable, compared to only thirty-five percent who disagreed – a 
similarly large margin of thirty percent. The Republican margin, however, was much smaller, 
with fifty-four percent stating it was acceptable, compared to forty-six percent saying it was 
not. This asymmetry gives credence to the idea that the number of Democrats in the sample 
may have artificially produced the trend in the overall population, as Democrats 
disproportionately favored the “acceptable” option the most. This could have perhaps biased 
the results to this question.  
 The statistics show that both the Democratic and independent differences are 
statistically significant, with a significance level below 0.01, solidifying the results and proving 
that both Democrats and Independents favor rejecting a nominee to the Supreme Court because 
of their ideology alone. However, the small difference that existed within the Republicans in 
the sample did not attain statistical significance when the percentages of “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” results were examined, ultimately yielding a p value equal to 0.20. This 
indicates that perhaps Republicans might find it unacceptable to reject a nominee solely 
because of their ideology, though it is impossible to truly tell. These results seem to imply a 
partisan bias, as a Republican appointee is currently before the Senate, and his ideology is 
central to whether he is ultimately confirmed or rejected. Lamentably, this paper lacks data 
taken during the Obama Presidency on this issue that would help to validate this theory, as it 
might potentially show the opposite skew within the data.   
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 Nevertheless, these data raise questions about the validity of earlier results, as it shows 
that perhaps there is convergence between the mass electorate and the political elite on certain 
issues pertaining to the court. 
 
 Finally, the last two questions were crafted to examine individual’s opinions about the 
type of Justice they would like to see on the Supreme Court. The first question asked 
respondents to state what their ideal type of Supreme Court Justice would be, which was done 
by creating four possible answers, and asking respondents to order these answers in terms of 
their personal preference (with 1 being the most ideal and 4 being the least ideal). The next 
question was delivered in the same format, but asked what the most important aspect or 
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characteristic of a Supreme Court Justice is. These two questions were intended to examine the 
ways in which individuals relate to the Supreme Court, and to see if they choose answers 
consistent with the hypotheses presented in this piece.  
 Question thirteen yielded results consistent with hypotheses B, as it showed most 
individuals said a Justice who is focused on justice, or a Justice who decides each case on the 
facts as they are presented, was their ideal type of Supreme Court Justice. Consequently, 
upwards of seventy percent said a Justice who agreed with their politics was the least ideal of 
the four choices presented. In fact, most individuals rated a justice who shares their values and 
a justice who shares their politics as a three or a four, indicating these responses were not 
nearly as important as the two more normative, non partisan answer choices.  
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 Democrats, Republicans, and Independent all expressed similar voting patterns on this 
question, with the majority of “1’s” and “2’s” accumulating in the columns on the right, the so 
called “nonideological” ideal justices, while most of the “3’s” and “4’s” tend to gravitate 
towards Justices who are somehow scored against a partisan or otherwise ideological 
measuring stick.  The graphs below make it very clear that the American public would prefer a 
Justice who is more focused on the facts of each case, and wants to ensure justice is carried out, 
rather than an ideologue who conforms to party standards. Similarly, the most “4” votes 
without fail appeared in the column that was linked explicitly to politics, further solidifying that 
idea that the political beliefs of a judge hold very little bearing on the way the American public 
feels about that individual.  
 This is in contrast to politicians who use any means necessary to ascertain the judicial 
philosophies of potential nominees before ultimately deciding how they vote on the issues. 
While judges are never explicitly labeled as Democratic or Republican, much is made over 
their “conservative” or “liberal” ideologies, which serve as a sort of proxies for a belief set 
loosely aligned with either one of the political parties. Frequently, political elites take to saying 
that Justices must have ideologies that fall within the mainstream to be considered acceptable to 
sit on the Supreme Court, but in this way, these data suggest that the American mainstream is 
not concerned with partisanship or ideology whatsoever; rather they would prefer a Judge who 
approaches each case with a reverence for the due process of law and deeply examines each 
and every legal matter that is brought before them. In this way, we see yet another chasm that 
exists between political elites, and their chief constituencies, the American people.  
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 Last but not least, question fourteen honed in on specific traits and characteristics a 
Justice might possess in order to see which were considered the most important. As previously 
stated, the structure mirrored that of the question that preceded it, though the results were not 
what they were anticipated to be.  
 In the graph (below), it would seem that the first and second preference votes are far 
more diffuse throughout the sample, though what is clear is that the characteristic of being 
apolitical is not deemed as important as the other three. Notwithstanding, being qualified, 
unbiased, and having a respect for the constitution are typically regarded as paramount to any 
potential Justice, but given the nonpartisan nature of the hypotheses, one would anticipate the 
apolitical response would have received far more importance amongst the population than it 
ultimately did in this instance.  
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 As we have seen through roughly all the previously examples, the trends demonstrated 
within the total population have roughly played out in the exact same manner in the partisan 
subsets that are being studied. Interestingly, the smallest percentage of Democrats out of the 
three groups indicated that respect for the constitution was the most important characteristic, 
while having a larger percentage of individuals listing apolitical as the most important 
characteristic. Both Republicans and Independents did not achieve such high percentages in 
this category however.  
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 The Chi-square that was made from the 2016 data was remade here with the 2017 data 
to see if the election of Donald Trump has led to a transformation of partisan dynamics. 
Ultimately, the result is that it did not, and there was not a break down in consensus on what 
type of Justice is preferred by the American people. Again, as the 2016 data showed, there is no 
significant difference that exists (P value far greater than .05) between Democrats and 
Republicans on this specific issue, and as sizable majorities of those involved in the survey 
chose a nonideological judge as their preference, we can see a definite departure with the 
political class of individuals who places explicit importance on have Justices who will rule to 
uphold precedent which they personally believe in.  
 Type of Justice Preferred: Ideological 
Type of Justice 
Preferred: 
Nonideological 
Marginal Row 
Totals 
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Democrats 83   (77.98)   [0.32] 209   (214.02)   [0.12] 292 
Republicans 58   (63.02)   [0.4] 178   (172.98)   [0.15] 41 
Marginal Column 
Totals 141 387  
 Chi2 Statistic = 0.9875 P value = .320344  
 
Conclusion 
 Antonin Scalia’s death in 2016 created a vacancy on the Supreme Court that, according 
to the United States Constitution, it was then President Barack Obama’s responsibility to fill. 
Yet, in spite of this, Senate leaders told the President that there would be no hearings, there 
would be no vote, and that there would be no seat on the court for the President’s nominee, 
Merrick Garland. Democrats derided this decision, calling it brinksmanship, partisan 
obstructionism – polarization in its highest form. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest 
slammed the move as “a historic and unprecedented acceleration of politicizing a branch of 
government that’s supposed to be insulated from politics” (Herszenhorn 2016, 2), yet this move 
represented the next step in a process that has been taking place for far longer than the Press 
Secretary may have been aware. The politicization of the Supreme Court has been a slow and 
steady process, starting in the earliest days of the Republic, persisting until this very moment, 
where it has perhaps reached a fever pitch.  
 American politics and political systems are incredibly complex, and there are very few 
aspects of the modern American system that perfectly resemble their original form, or live up to 
the exact purpose they were designed to fill. Yet it is this very complexity and unpredictability 
that make the institutional continuity of the Supreme Court so remarkable. Given the volatility 
that exists, an example of a phenomenon that persists in spite of changes to the electorate, in 
 94 
spite of institutional transformations then, would – and rightly should - be considered a rarity. 
In the case of the Supreme Court and the nomination process, the tensions that have flared as of 
late are quite the opposite of what Mr. Earnest suggested in January 2016; they represent the 
consequences of over 225 years of using and abusing the court for its ability to deeply influence 
the American political landscape.  
 The purpose of this paper was to fully analyze the ways in which the Supreme Court 
and by extension, the nomination process, were politicized in an effort to hijack them and in 
essence mutate them into covertly political, policy making bodies, often with the intention of 
bypassing the legislative and executive branches to achieve political aims. This change came 
from both inside and outside the institution, with notable judges like Marshall, Holmes, and 
Warren all having profound impacts on the courts ability to make and review decisions, as well 
as to overturn acts of congress. But they were not alone in their efforts, with President’s and 
Senators like Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Biden clashing with the Judiciary or its nominees in order 
to ensure the ability to control the decision-making agenda was not lost. But through it all, one 
notable actor was explicitly left out – the people.  
 There exists a fundamental disconnect between the average American, and the members 
of the political class of politicians, jurists, lobbyists, and activists who pursue their own 
individual agendas in spite of prevailing public opinion. In fact, the public outcry was the 
largest and most palpable when the court was seen as abusing its power, in essence when the 
court used its role as an impartial arbiter of the law to serve as the final voice on some of the 
most salient and controversial issues of its time. There has been a litany of examples presented 
that solidifies this divide; in spite of what has happened to the court and its politics, the 
American public still believes in a normative version of the court. A court that can remain 
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apolitical and impartial, and that can remain above the political fray.  
 This was proven not only with an in depth analysis of the literature and a developed 
study of American history, but with contemporary analyses and hard data that show that 
something more is at play. Politicians have to emphasize differences, as it is central to political 
gamesmanship to create an “us vs them” mentality, and truly it is easier to identify those who 
do not agree as the enemy of progress. Even now, Senate Democrats led by minority leader 
Chuck Schumer (D-NY) seek the filibuster the nomination of President Trump’s nominee to 
the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch. Though is this really what Americans would like to see 
happen? Is this seriously what Democrats believe is correct for the country? When one 
endeavors to uncover what is really going on in the mind of Americans across the United 
States, the results are far more uniform than one might have previously expected. Not only do 
Americans agree on non-partisan issues, they even agree on some of the most hotly debated 
issues of the day. Majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents agree that the 
Senate had a constitutional obligation hold hearings on Judge Merrick Garland, with even 
larger numbers agreeing that Judge Gorsuch deserved the same. Huge majorities agree that the 
court remaining apolitical was highly important, and affirmed that the vacant seat left when 
Antonin Scalia died should be filled, rather than being kept artificially empty as a result of 
some never ending filibuster or parliamentary procedure. These same groups indicated that the 
courts functionality and ability to function effectively as a branch of government was 
significantly more important than the court upholding political decisions the individual agreed 
with, and signaled that their ideal Supreme Court Justice was somebody who cared about the 
facts of each case and was focused on Justice, rather than a partisan who espoused the same 
values or political beliefs as the respondents in question. Again, large numbers of Democrats, 
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Republicans, and Independents all stated that when it comes to the characteristics of a nominee, 
the most important factors are that the candidate is unbiased and qualified, while the political 
leanings of the prospective justice. All this information affirms there is a two-track way of 
thinking in the United States – the elites who pursue a more partisan centric agenda, and the 
mass public, who prefers normative good to politically beneficial outcomes.  
 But in a larger sense, what this paper proves is that the American public is far less 
divided then it is presumed to be when it comes to the topic of the Supreme Court. The 2016 
election brought with it unprecedented partisanship and polarization, and the evidence 
presented herein does not on the whole invalidate this perception of the United States. 
However, what it shows is that consensus does exist on a variety of issues of and pertaining to 
the judicial branch of the United States government – that normative beliefs still have a place in 
the collective American psyche.   
 What is striking is that, in spite of all the ways the country has changed, through 
realigning elections, wars, and different political regimes, the same type of politicization of the 
Supreme Court has continued to take place. This type of behavior is not isolated to Democrats, 
or Republicans, but rather it is confined to the political elite – those with the most to gain from 
using the court as a political tool.  
 Ultimately, this study could be expanded to further hone in on the nuances that exist 
within the realm of public opinion. This survey was limited in scope, and the historical analysis 
was somewhat limited. Further research might conduct audit studies on periodicals from the 
period to attain a more accurate depiction of what public opinion was like in each period. 
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APPENDIX A 
Complete list of survey questions: 
 
1) On a scale of 1-100, how important would you say the following is: “The United States Supreme 
Court protects the values I care about”  
 
 
2) On a scale of 1-100, how important would you say the following is: “The United States Supreme 
Court functions properly”  
 
  
3) On a scale of 1-100, how important would you say the following is: “The United States Supreme 
Court makes decisions I agree with”  
 
 
4) On a scale of 1-100, how important would you say the following is: “The United States Supreme 
Court should never have a vacant seat so it can operate effectively.”  
 
 
5) What is your opinion of the following statement: "The Senate had a constitutional obligation to 
hold hearings for Judge Merrick Garland." 
 
Strongly agree (1) 
 
Agree (2) 
 
Somewhat agree (3) 
 
Neither agree nor disagree (4) 
 
Somewhat disagree (5) 
 
Disagree (6) 
 
Strongly disagree (7) 
 
6) Do you think it is ever acceptable for the United States Senate to filibuster a nominee to the 
Supreme Court? 
 
Always acceptable (1) 
 
Sometimes acceptable (2) 
 
Sometimes unacceptable (3) 
 
Never acceptable (4) 
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7) Do you think it is ever acceptable for the United States Senate to use ideological litmus tests 
when considering a nominee to the Supreme Court? 
 
Always acceptable (1) 
 
Sometimes acceptable (2) 
 
Sometimes unacceptable (3) 
 
Never acceptable (4) 
 
 
8) What is your opinion of the following statement: "The Senate has a constitutional obligation to 
hold hearings for Judge Neil Gorsuch” 
 
Strongly agree (1) 
 
Agree (2) 
 
Somewhat agree (3) 
 
Neither agree nor disagree (4) 
 
Somewhat disagree (5) 
 
Disagree (6) 
 
Strongly disagree (7) 
    
       9) Do you believe the United States Senate should hold hearings and a vote on the President’s 
nominee for the vacant seat on the Supreme Court, or should the seat be left vacant? 
 
       Seat should be filled (1) 
 
       Seat should be left vacant (2) 
  
       Unsure/Don’t Know (3) 
 
10) In your opinion, how important is it that the Supreme Court remains an apolitical body, that is, 
how important is it that the Supreme Court is treated differently and the other branches of 
government? 
 
Incredibly important (1) 
 
Important (2)  
 
Somewhat important (3) 
 
Somewhat unimportant (4) 
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Unimportant (5) 
 
Incredibly unimportant (6) 
 
Don’t know/Unsure (7) 
 
11) Do you believe it is acceptable to reject a nominee for the Supreme Court purely because of 
their ideology? 
 
Very acceptable (1)  
 
Acceptable (2) 
 
Somewhat acceptable (3) 
 
Somewhat unacceptable (4) 
 
Unacceptable (5) 
 
Very unacceptable (6) 
 
Don’t know/Unsure (7) 
 
12) In your opinion, what is the correct way to interpret the Constitution of the United States?  
 
  Read the words literally (1) 
  
  Make decisions based on the original intent of the founders (2) 
 
   Relate the words to a modern context (3) 
 
13) How would you describe your ideal Supreme Court justice? Please rank the following 
descriptions from 1-4 in order of importance (1 being the most important, 4 being the least 
important) 
 
Someone who agrees with my values (1) 
 
Someone who shares the same political beliefs as me (2) 
 
Someone who is more focused on justice than politics (3) 
 
Someone who decides each individual case based on the merits/facts as they are presented (4) 
 
14) What characteristics are the most important in a Supreme Court Justice? Please rank the 
following descriptions from 1-4 in order of importance (1 being the most important, 4 being the 
least important) 
 
A candidate who is unbiased (1) 
 
A candidate who is qualified (2)  
 
 100 
A candidate who is apolitical (3)  
 
A candidate who respects the constitution (4) 
 
 
15) We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. On most political issues, do 
you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or conservative? 
 
Extremely liberal (1) 
 
Somewhat liberal (2) 
 
Lean liberal (3) 
 
Neither liberal nor conservative/Moderate (4) 
 
Lean conservative (5) 
 
Somewhat conservative (6) 
 
Extremely conservative (7) 
 
16) Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, an 
 
Independent, or something else? 
 
Republican (1) 
 
Democrat (2) 
 
Independent (3) 
 
Other (4) 
 
17) Are you registered to vote? 
 
Yes (1) 
 
No (2) 
 
I don't know (3) 
 
18) What racial or ethnic group do you consider yourself? (Select all that apply) 
 
Alaskan Native (1) 
 
American Indian/Native American (2) 
 
Asian (3) 
 
African American/Black (4) 
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Hispanic/Latino/Latina/Chicano/Chicana (5) 
 
Pacific Islander (6) 
 
White/Caucasian (7) 
 
Arab/Arab American (8) 
 
19) In what year were you born? 
 
Year(1)  
 
20) How many years of schooling have you completed? For example, 12 years would 
be a high school graduate, and 16 is a college graduate? 
 
Years(1)  
 
21) Are you male or female? 
 
Male (1) 
 
Female (2) 
 
Other (3) 
 
22) Please estimate the total combined annual income before taxes for you and the other members 
for household. 
 
Less than $29,999 (1) 
 
$30,000 to $49,999 (2) 
 
$50,000 to $99,999 (3) 
 
$100,000 to $299,999 (4) 
 
More than $300,000 (5) 
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APPENDIX B: 
Replication data can be made available upon request. 
Table A: 
Question Mean 
#1 
Mean 
#2  
Difference Standard 
Error 
95% CI t - 
statistic 
DF Significance 
level 
Q1 v Q2 70.53 69.18 1.352 1.546 -1.6819 to 4.3857 0.874 998 P = 0.3821 
Q1 v Q4 70.74 69.18 1.562 1.711 -1.7955 to 4.9195 0.913 998 P = 0.3615 
Q3 v Q4 70.74 62.02 8.715 1.669 5.4406 to 11.9896 5.223 998 P < 0.0001 
Q3 v Q2 70.53 62.02 8.505 1.499 5.5633 to 11.4467 5.673 998 P < 0.0001 
Q3 v Q1 69.18 62.02 7.153 1.468 4.2726 to 10.0336 4.873 998 P < 0.0001 
 
Table B: 
Question Mean 
#1 
Mean 
#2  
Difference Standard 
Error 
95% CI t - 
statistic 
DF Significance 
level 
Dem v 
Rep: Q1 
71.855 68.179 -3.676 2.602 -8.7947 to 1.4427 -1.413 340 P = 0.1587 
Dem v 
Rep: Q2 
73.632 65.894 -7.738 2.746 -13.1391 to -2.3369 -2.818 340 P = 0.0051 
Dem v 
Rep: Q3 
65.855 59.797 -5.058 2.469 -9.9141 to -0.2019 -2.049 340 P = 0.0413 
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Dem v 
Rep: Q4 
75.282 65.455 -9.827 3.285 -16.2878 to -3.3662 -2.992 340 P = 0.0030 
Dem v 
Ind: Q1 
71.855 66.333 -5.522 2.422 -10.2845 to -0.7595 -2.280 376 P = 0.0232 
Dem v 
Ind: Q2 
73.632 69.918 -3.714 2.508 -8.6458 to 1.2178 -1.481 376 P = 0.1395 
Dem v 
Ind: Q3 
65.855 59.937 -4.918 2.257 -9.3555 to -0.4805 -2.179 376 P = 0.0299 
Dem v 
Ind: Q4 
75.282 68.981 -6.301 2.954 -12.1093 to -0.4927 -2.133 376 P = 0.0336 
Rep v 
Ind: Q1 
68.179 66.333 -1.846 3.082 -7.9130 to 4.2210 -0.599 278 P = 0.5497 
Rep v 
Ind: Q2 
65.894 69.918 4.024 3.143 -2.1636 to 10.2116 1.280 278 P = 0.2015 
Rep v 
Ind: Q3 
59.797 59.937 0.140 2.847 -5.4652 to 5.7452 0.049 278 P = 0.9608 
Rep v 
Ind: Q4 
65.455 68.981 3.526 3.749 -3.8543 to 10.9063 0.940 278 P = 0.3478 
 
Table C: 
Question 
5 
Percentage 
Agree 
Percentage 
Disagree 
Difference 95% CI Significance 
level 
Dems 76.522 4.438 72.17 % 66.3859 to 77.9451% P < 0.0001 
Inds 64.150 11.321 52.83 % 42.8596 to 61.5102% P < 0.0001 
Reps 56.000 24.000 32 %  20.5901 to 43.4099% P < 0.0001 
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Table D: 
Question 
8 
Percentage 
Agree 
Percentage 
Disagree 
Difference 95% CI Significance 
level 
Dems 73.182 8.364 64.55 % 56.7344 to 71.1885% P < 0.0001 
Inds 68.553 13.836 54.72 % 44.6302 to 63.3947% P < 0.0001 
Reps 79.675 4.878 74.80  % 67.4175 to 82.1825% P < 0.0001 
 
Table E: 
Question
s 6 & 7 
Percentag
e Agree 
Percentage 
Disagree 
Difference 95% CI Significance 
level 
Dems – 6  58.447 
 
41.553 
 
16.895 % 7.2548 to 26.2087% P = 0.0004 
Inds – 6  59.350 
 
40.650 
 
18.699% 7.2944 to 29.6015% P = 0.0009 
Reps – 6  53.459 
 
46.541 
 
6.918 % -6.1086 to 19.7040% P = .2789 
Dems – 7  60.455 
 
39.545 
 
20.909 % 11.3015 to 30.1126 % P < 0.0001 
Inds – 7  69.919 
 
30.081 
 
39.837 % 28.8513 to 49.7495% 
 
P < 0.0001 
Reps – 7 55.063 
 
44.937 
 
10.127 % -2.9225 to 22.8228 P = 0.1130 
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Table F: 
Question 
9 
Percentage 
for filling 
seat 
Percentage 
against 
filling seat 
Difference 95% CI Significance 
level 
Dems 66.667 
 
14.612 
 
52.0548% 44.4642 to 59.6454% P < 0.0001 
Inds 69.620 
 
20.253 
 
49.367 % 40.1253 to 58.6087% P < 0.0001 
Reps 83.607 
 
8.197 
 
75.410 % 68.0205 to 82.7995% P < 0.0001 
 
Table G: 
Question 
10 
Percentage 
More 
Important 
Percentage 
Less 
Important 
Difference 95% CI DF Significance 
level 
 75.348 7.753 67.594% 62.7652 to 71.8964% 1 P < 0.0001 
 
Table H: 
Question 
10 
Percentage 
More 
Important 
Percentage 
Less Important 
Difference 95% CI DF Significance 
level 
Dems 75.455 
 
6.818 
 
68.636% 61.1305 to 75.9102% 1 P < 0.0001 
Inds 67.924 
 
8.805 
 
59.119% 50.9512 to 67.2868% 1 P < 0.0001 
Reps 73.387 
 
7.258 
 
66.129% 57.6531 to 74.6049% 1 P < 0.0001 
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Table I: 
Question 
11 
Percentage 
Acceptable 
Percentage 
Unacceptable 
Difference 95% CI DF Significance 
level 
 61.155 
 
38.845 
 
22.311 % 16.0617 to 28.3729% 1 P < 0.0001 
 
Table J: 
Question 
11 
Percentage 
Acceptable 
Percentage 
Unacceptable 
Difference 95% CI DF Significance 
level 
Dems 67.727 
 
32.273 
 
35.455 % 26.1015 to 44.1210 1 P < 0.0001 
Inds 65.041 
 
34.959 
 
30.081 % 19.642 to 40.5200 1 P < 0.0001 
Reps 54.088 
 
45.912 
 
8.176% -4.5763 to 20.9283 1 P = 0.2006 
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